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Abstract
The theory of interaction-based evolution argues that, at the most basic level of analysis, there is a
third alternative for how adaptive evolution works besides a) accidental mutation and natural se-
lection and b) Lamarckism, namely, c) information provided by natural selection on the fit between
the organism and its environment is absorbed by non-accidental mutation. This non-accidental mu-
tation is non-Lamarckian yet useful for evolution, and is due to evolved and continually evolving
mutational mechanisms operating in the germ cells. However, this theory has left a fundamental
problem open: If mutational mechanisms are not Lamarckian—if they are not “aware” of the en-
vironment and the macroscale phenotype—then how could heritable novelty be due to anything
other than accidental mutation? This paper aims to address this question by arguing the following.
Mutational mechanisms can be broadly construed as enacting local simplification operations on the
DNA in germ cells, along with gene duplication. The joint action of these mutational operations and
natural selection provides simplification under performance pressure. This joint action creates from
preexisting biological interactions new elements that have the inherent capacity to come together
into unexpected useful interactions with other such elements, thus explaining nature’s tendency
for cooption. Novelty thus arises not from a local genetic accident but from gradual network-level
evolution. Many empirical observations are explained from this perspective, from cooption and
gene fusion at the molecular level, to the evolution of behavior and instinct at the organismal level.
Finally, the nature of mutational mechanisms and the need to study them in detail are described,
and a connection is drawn between evolution and learning.
Keywords: Evolvability, learning, instinct, stereotypy, genetic assimilation, evolution of language,
parsimony.
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The problem is not to choose the correct scale of description, but
rather to recognize that change is taking place on many scales at
the same time, and that it is the interaction among phenomena
on different scales that must occupy our attention.
—Simon A. Levin, 1992.
1 Introduction
The theory of interaction-based evolution [93] argues that the mutations that drive adaptive evolu-
tion under selection are not local accidents occurring to the genome. Instead, they result from the
action of evolved and continually evolving complex biological mechanisms [93] and are therefore
affected by genetic interactions across loci. It follows that mutation combines information from
alleles across loci and writes the result of the combination into one locus—the locus of the mu-
tation [93]. The schematic figure that describes this nature of mutation (Figure 1a) is much like
that which would represent gene interaction and regulation, except that the outcome of the action
in this case is genetic change. “Mutation” here is broadly construed to encompass not only DNA
mutations but also epigenetic changes.
Moving to the population level, we see that the outcome of a mutational event in one generation—
namely the mutation itself—can serve as an input into mutational events at later generations [93].
Therefore, mutations create a network of information flow across the genome and through the gen-
erations (Figure 2) [93]. This suggests at the outset a process by which the genome can evolve as
a cohesive whole [109, 93].
This view immediately affects how we conceptualize fundamental questions in evolution, such
as the question of the role of sex in evolution [44]. A layman’s intuition has been that, since natural
selection acts on individual variation, the vast number of different genetic combinations generated
by sex facilitates adaptive evolution. However, this answer has been incomplete from a theoretical
perspective because, just as sex puts together these combinations, it also breaks them down: they
are not heritable. However, if mutation is not simply a local accident, but instead encapsulates
a flow of information across loci, then although individual genotypes are transient, they can have
effects on future generations through the mutations that are derived from them (Figure 1b) [93, 94],
and the original intuition holds in some sense. Such information flow through mutation enables a
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situation where selection evaluates each individual as a complex whole, and information from that
individual as a complex whole is passed on by mutations precisely in accord with the individual’s
fitness [93]1.
Another such question is the nature of mutation. Recently, evidence has been accumulating
showing that mutational events are complex and involve genetic information and biological mech-
anisms [93]. From a traditional standpoint, these complex influences on mutation are seen as
happenstantial and do not command attention. In contrast, interaction-based evolution argues
that they are at the heart of the evolutionary process.
By putting together the problem of the role of sex in evolution, the question of the nature of
mutation and more, interaction-based evolution has put together many questions and observations
previously disconnected and has raised multiple predictions and directions for future research [93].
However, it has left a fundamental problem open. The traditional view takes random mutation
to be the ultimate source of heritable innovation and creativity in evolution: random mutation
invents, and natural selection selects2. However, if mutation is not accidental and never was, then
what is the ultimate source of heritable novelty?
In particular, interaction-based evolution does not admit Lamarckism—it does not admit a
mechanism that senses a phenotypic need in multicellulars through interaction with the environment
and translates that need into the required genetic change. But if the influences on mutation are
not “aware” of the environment and the phenotypic need, then how could the ultimate source of
heritable novelty in evolution be anything other than random mutation? This paper will propose
an answer, thus completing the replacement to random mutation at a conceptual level that started
with the first interaction-based evolution paper [93].
Inspiring, long-term efforts by Wagner and colleagues have shown that network-level evolution
is key to innovation (e.g., [106, 37, 38, 154]). To answer the question above, I will continue these
efforts in the direction of interaction-based evolution. I will propose here the following. i) Novelty
arises from gradual network-level evolution. ii) The phenotypic meaning of a genetic element is
gradually absorbed from the network in the course of network-level evolution and is not bequeathed
1We are no longer restricted to the effective transmission of additive genetic effects.
2Even the evolvability approach [80, 155], which allows for the evolution of mechanisms affecting mutation [74,
88, 1], still relies either implicitly or explicitly on accidental mutation at the origin of things, and assumes that
evolvability mechanisms are merely later add-ons to the core process of random mutation and natural selection, ones
that play a facilitatory but not a fundamentally necessary role.
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to it by a local genetic accident. iii) Molecular cooption—i.e., the case where a preexisting genetic
element comes to be used in a new context—is not simply an outcome of stochastic events but is an
outcome of a gradual process of network-level evolution, where non-accidental mutations pave the
way and predispose the genome to cooption. iv) This process of gradual network-level evolution
and the fact that the phenotypic meaning of a mutation comes from context rather than arises
anew based on a specific function per se also explain the evolution of innateness, previously known
as the problem of the “inheritance of acquired characters.” In this connection, we will see that
automatization is at the essence of the evolutionary process. v) Simplification and complexity are
connected: While selection puts a pressure for organismal level performance, there exists in addition
genetic simplification pressure due to mutational and recombinational mechanisms. Together, the
pressures for performance and simplification drive the evolution of complexity and novelty, surpris-
ingly connecting simplicity and complexity. In particular, elements simplified under performance
pressure are expectedly unexpectedly useful: they have the inherent capacity to come together
in interaction with other such elements and thus become useful in unexpected, novel ways. This
inherent ability, which accounts for cooption, is the source of novelty in evolution. vi) Evolution
is driven at the molecular level by evolved and continually evolving mutational mechanisms that
implement useful operations, much like Hebbian learning and other non-random operations are
thought to be useful in learning. A search for these mutational mechanisms, both empirical and
theoretical, needs to begin.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section will describe the nature of network-level
evolution. Section 3 will introduce the idea of simplification under performance pressure. Together,
these two sections will propose how non-accidental mutations could be useful for evolution yet be
non-Lamarckian, and how novelty arises. Section 4 will then bring a large number of empirical
observations in support of the view proposed here. These will be observations on the evolution
of behavior at the organismal scale. Of particular importance will be subsection 4.12.2, where
all the concepts developed will come together in an empirical example with an emphasis on the
evolution of novelty. Finally, section 5 will revisit the molecular level in light of the concepts
developed, discuss the nature of mutational mechanisms and draw a connection between evolution
and learning, including machine learning, thus underscoring the importance of the algorithmic lens
[120, 73] for our understanding of evolution.
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2 A contextual view of genetics
Due to the molecular biological revolution, it has become clear that the same or similar genetic
element can be seen in two or more different genetic contexts within the same species or in different
species [76]. This means that, over evolutionary time, a molecule can change the context in which it
serves—it can be “coopted.” For example, the frog toxin caerulein has been independently coopted
from the homologous gastrointestinal peptide hormones cholecystokinin and gastrin, with whose
action it interferes in the affected animals [124, 12]. And proteins involved in cellular stress response,
like the small heat shock proteins [68], have often been coopted as light refracting crystallins in
the lens of the eye, an avascular tissue presenting harsh biophysical conditions [141]. Indeed,
“Cooption,” “opportunism,” or “tinkering” [69, 59] is so important that it has been called “the
paradigm of molecular evolution” [59]. But how does cooption happen? Does a genetic sequence
just jump one day by accident from one locus to another and acquires a new use?
Traditional discussions admit but do not explain shifts in the context of usage of a genetic
element or a phenotype. In them, natural selection is limited to building up one independent or
additive contribution to fitness on top of another toward advancement in the same adaptation.
This provides no explanation for cases where an element is first used in one context and then in
another, beyond saying that they are due to chance. This paper will begin to fill this gap, by
delving into the question of what makes it so that evolution is capable of producing building blocks
that, combined with other elements in a network, produce novel functionality.
As will become relevant soon, we often see that fusion accompanies cooption. For example,
members of the cyclophilin family, which have been found in bacteria, fungi, plants and animals
[140], have a peptidyl-prolyl cis-trans isomerase activity which allows them to participate in diverse
biological processes in all subcellular compartments, from protein translocation across membranes,
to mitochondrial function, to control of transcription, and more (see [23] and references therein);
and it is the presence of different additional domains in the different family members that specifies
their unique localizations and interactants [23]. The next section will examine a particular fusion
involving a cyclophilin family member, cyclophilin A.
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2.1 Cooption at the molecular level is due to a gradual process
We will now see two motivating examples, one from molecular evolution and one from phenotypic
evolution.
Cyclophilin A (CypA) is a highly abundant cytosolic protein [60] that, among its various ac-
tivities, potently binds several retroviral capsids, including HIV-1 [71]. TRIM5 is a restriction
factor that recognizes and inactivates incoming retroviral capsids [146]. A copy of the CypA
gene has retroposed into the TRIM5 gene independently in at least two different simian lineages
[146, 116, 128, 92, 13, 168, 115], and the resulting TRIM5-CypA fusion protein appears to provide
strong protection against certain lentiviruses [116, 128]. The curious nature of these independent
fusions has been noted [146, 93]: not only is a repeated fusion event even more surprising from a
traditional perspective than a repeated point mutation (there are many more possibilities of fusion,
making repeated fusion by chance even less likely), there are many other TRIM genes, and tests
of artificial fusions of the CypA domain to some TRIM motifs have shown that they too can pro-
vide retrovirus protection [172, 170, 171], yet TRIM5 specifically repeats in both fusions mentioned
above [146]. Furthermore, it has been suggested that genetic factors have influenced the probability
of the fusion, such as the extensive transcription of CypA in the germline [71, 70, 146, 93].
The current theory argues that this fusion (and others like it) was not due to a sudden, chance
event, but rather was the culmination of a gradual genetic and phenotypic evolutionary process that
led to it. Minor genetic changes have accumulated, predisposing the genome to the appearance
of the fusion, and thus accounting for the fact that it appeared independently multiple times.
Furthermore, I argue that TRIM5 and CypA interacted with each other prior to their fusion.
Thus, the fusion did not cause TRIM5 and CypA to interact to begin with, but rather was led by
their preexisting interaction.
Furthermore, I hypothesize a specific mechanism that promotes such fusions. Two genes that
work together in the soma in a particular context likely are transcribed at the same time. Because
they may share cis elements and transcription factors that activate them, information indicating
that they work together in the soma is likely present in the DNA and accessible in the germline,
in particular to the transcriptional machinery. The two genes may be transcribed in the germline
at the same time, making it so that the chromatin will be open at both loci at the same time.
7
And since reverse transcription occurs in the germline [15], it will be more likely to land a copy
of one of these genes next to the other in the DNA. Other steps may further facilitate the fusion,
such as trans-splicing prior to reverse transcription. Interestingly, the fact that transcription is
promiscuous in the germline allows any genes—somatic as well as germline genes—to participate
in this mechanism [93].
One may think that it just so happens that the genetic system allows for such mechanisms,
or that they are fortuitous “accidents.” However, following [93], I argue that, rather than being
happenstantial, mechanisms of this sort are of much significance. In particular, the mechanism
abovementioned is reminiscent in a certain respect of Hebbian learning in neuroscience (Stephen
Pacala, personal communications)3. According to Hebbian learning [62], when one neuron per-
sistently participates in causing another to fire, the strength of the connection between them is
increased, making it so that neurons “wire together if they fire together” [104]. Similarly, here, I
argue that copies of genes that are used together are fused together. Or, to be more precise, copies
of genes that are persistently used together in a new context are more likely to be fused. Note that
this Hebbian-learning–like genetic operation is implemented by the mutational mechanism itself.
This contrasts with a recent proposal involving Hebbian learning in evolution without invoking non-
accidental mutation [160] and accords with the principle of interaction-based evolution, according
to which the mutations relevant for adaptive evolution are non-accidental.
2.2 Cooption at the phenotypic level is due to a gradual process
Examples of cooption and fusion are also apparent at the phenotypic level. Consider the inciting
ceremony in ducks [101, 98, 100]. In the European common shelduck (Tadorna tadorna), when the
female is standing near her mate, her aggression instinct is triggered by the presence of neighbors,
and she may run toward them with her neck stretched, which is the threat posture in ducks [100].
As she approaches them she naturally becomes fearful, turns around and flees back toward her
drake4. Approaching her drake, the former instinct is triggered again. In those cases where her
breast is still facing him, she turns her neck back to threaten the neighbors over her shoulder. This
behavior by the female can incite her mate to attack the neighbors. Note that the angle between the
3The connection between evolution and learning will be further elaborated on in section 5.6
4This to-and-fro movement is not surprising, as it is very common in territorial disputes across species of birds,
fish and mammals.
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neck and the body of the female is entirely dependent here on the situation—her body orientation
is due to the location of the drake and her neck orientation is due to the location of the neighbors
[100].
Lorenz followed the homologues of this behavior in other duck species and suggested that the
to-and-fro movement such as seen in the common shelduck has gradually become ritualized, so
that, in the ritualized forms, the female does not perform the to-and-fro but stands near her drake;
and, most interestingly, the two elements of orienting the body toward the male and stretching
the neck over the shoulder toward the neighbors—which in the non-ritualized forms are triggered
separately by the environment—have become welded together [101, 98, 100]. For example, in the
East European-Asiatic ruddy sheldrake (Tadorna ferruginea), the neck and body orientations are
still controlled separately, but in most of the cases the female stands with her breast to the drake and
her neck pointing backwards (and very rarely this behavior may be performed without a neighbor
present) [100]. And in the mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), the same breast-to-the-male-and-pointing-
backwards is observed, but now this posture is compulsory and, at high excitation, which turns
the instinct on (the same relationship between excitation and activation of instinct exists for many
other instincts), the female is compelled to turn her neck over her shoulder even if that means that
the neck moves away from the neighbor [98]. Thus, two elements of behavior, previously triggered
separately by two separate environmental triggers, have become welded together and triggered as
one. Finally, in the golden-eye (Bucephala), where the movement is highly ritualized (see below),
the presence of a conspecific is not even required [100].
Interestingly, along with the evolutionary change of form of the behavior, there has been also
an evolutionary change of meaning. In the species with the less-ritualized form, the behavior has
the effect of inciting and is related to territorial behavior. However, note that it already has in it
an element of pair-bonding, or team work. In the more ritualized cases, this pair-bonding meaning
has moved to the fore: in the mallard, though it sometimes still elicits a demonstration of attack by
the male, inciting serves mostly as an invitation to pair-bond; and in the golden-eye, the inciting
has become almost entirely independent of the presence of neighbors, and takes a highly ritualized,
exaggerated and rhythmic form of neck movements over one shoulder and then the other (and
rhythmic movement is indicative of highly ritualized behaviors in general).
It is due to the highly surprising nature of this example and others that Lorenz has been accused
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of Lamarckian thinking. However, many examples of this sort exist, and we will see that they are
explained not by Lamarckism but by network-level evolution (sections 2.3, 4). What is important
to notice in the two examples discussed so far is as follows. In both of them, we see a gradual
process arising from preexisting interactions. A novel phenotype (the fused protein in one case,
the ritualized display in the other) arises from the change in context in which preexisting elements
(preexisting genes, movements) are embedded. In fact, what was once an interaction has now
become an object: in the case of TRIM5-CypA, a hypothesized interaction between two separate
genes is succeeded by a gene fusion; and in the evolution of the inciting ceremony, two separate
behavioral responses to two separate environmental triggers (orienting the body toward the drake
and threatening the neighbors over the shoulder) has now become fused into a new instinct. Thus,
the source of novelty is in system-level changes. In both cases, novelty arises not from a point-wise
change, not suddenly and not out of thin air.
Among else, we also see local simplification in both cases: in simians, what previously required
the separate transcription of two genes now requires the transcription of one, and in ducks, a
roundabout to-and-fro behavior has now turned into a stationary clear display. These aspects and
more will be explored in-depth in this paper, leading to novel insights on the fundamental nature
of evolution and to a macroscale-view of the theory of interaction-based evolution [93].
2.3 Network evolution and its operators
I will now propose a verbal model that ties shifts in context to network-level evolution. The model
is purposely described at a high level because its role is to elucidate concepts, not to provide
mechanistic detail.
Consider that in the course of genetic evolution, the network of genetic interactions gradually
changes as a whole. Many changes take place over the genome and over time, and these changes
interact. This process involves regulatory changes that can rewire the genetic network [18], such
as movements of transposable elements carrying with them cryptic enhancer/promoter sites and
multiple mutations activating those sites, for example [106]. But even a regulatory change that
at first sight appears only to change the strength of an already existing connection between two
nodes—e.g., to increase the effect of a regulator on its target—can effectively cause rewiring; because
there is no sharp boundary between the case where the regulator has a negligible effect on its target
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(in which case the two nodes can be said to be effectively disconnected) and the case where it has
a non-negligible effect (where the two nodes can be considered to be connected).
Rewiring means that, in the course of evolution, the connections between some nodes on the
network become tighter and the connections between other nodes become weaker, and recognizing
it is important. When the connections between nodes become tighter, they come to be regulated
more and more as one unit, and a new module arises. What in the beginning may be two separate
elements regulated by two separate lines of control can gradually come under one line of control. As
will be understood later, this change represents the arrival of a new automatic unit. Furthermore,
when this coming together of genes is preceded by the duplication of those genes and their regulatory
elements, this new module does not arise at the expense of previous ones, but represents a total
increase in the number of modules; and together with this increase in the number of modules comes
an increase in the extent of higher-level interactions between modules (since all the modules must
ultimately come together into one organism, and now there are more of them5.)
While the term “module” usually refers to a set of tightly interacting genes, a rather basic
module or unit is an exon; and since exons in separate loci may interact through trans-splicing, or
through protein-protein interactions, etc., the same kind of process can cause the coming together
of two previously interacting exons into a gene, or gene fusion. Such a fusion may be long in the
making. This shows us a case where a new elementary unit evolves from an interaction—from a
process—and where a process can become an object—a gene. And as an object, it begins to accept
the kind of operations that the system can apply to other objects. It is now interacting directly
and indirectly with many other units.
A critical point in the above now calls for reflection. It takes time for two elements to undergo
separate regulation and transcription in order to come together later into a functional unit or
interaction. But when they come together evolutionarily into one genetic unit, regulated as one
and performing through one product, this time is cut to zero. Previously, the joint effect of these
two elements came into being as developmental interactions do; now it is “innate”—it is a gene. It
5“Number” of modules and “more” modules could be put in quotations because modules do not have a precise
number, as they ultimately grade into each other, indeed because they have to be connected to each other. The
definition of a module used in the literature is a fuzzy one and rightly so: it is a set of genes that interact more closely
with each other than with other genes, even though to interact with the “outside,” at least some of its members have
to have just as strong a connection to members outside of the module. However, the fact that we cannot perfectly
count the total number of modules is an inherent characteristic of the process: it allows new modules to gradually
form.
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no longer needs to be constructed from more elementary units, and it exerts its effect in interaction
with other (now-peer) elementary units, in whose context it has phenotypic meaning. The emphasis
here is not on the actual amount of time cut, but on the local simplification of the network.
Thus, in the gradual fusion of two elements into one, we see a sense of evolutionary acceleration
of developmental interactions; and if this fusion is preceded by the copying of those two elements,
we see at the same time an increase in the “genetic vocabulary,” which comes together with an
increase in the extent of higher-level interactions—an increase in complexity.
Having thus formed a clear view of acceleration and the arising of new interactions with the help
of the gene fusion case, it is important to step back again and observe these two aspects in the big
picture. It is enough to consider the copying of modules and the changing of regulatory connections
(prior to considering actual gene fusion) in order to notice that these changes of connections can
be seen from two angles: When we look at the lower levels of organization—at the tightening of
connections between nodes—we see an increase in innate abilities. When we look at the higher
levels of organization—at the increase in the extent of interactions between modules due to the
appearance of new modules—we see an increase in the complexity of the life-form, the phenotype.
Importantly, these are two facets of one integrated process: the new parts observed at the lower
levels (which are due to constriction) and the new whole (which is due to the increase in the extent
of high-level interactions) coevolve. The novelty comes from a network-level change, not from a
sequence of independent, atomistic changes. And, as will be discussed, adaptation comes together
with innateness—with automatization.
Notice also that there are useful operators in the evolution of networks: The copying of nodes
along with their connections adds syntactic material to the network from the inside, which serves as
a basis for increasing complexity. The chunking of nodes and the severing of connections between
nodes allows nodes to separate from their previous context and join new contexts gradually.
One thing that is important about this section, and that will become clearer later, is the sense
of an Archimedes-screw–like operation of network-level evolution. An Archimedes screw is a helical
surface wrapped around a central shaft inside a pipe that is designed to carry water up from one
side of the pipe to another as the screw rotates. Each point rotates at its own level, yet due to
that rotation, water flows up. Likewise, in network-level evolution, when genetic interaction is
replaced by a gene in the course of evolution, or when a behavioral sequence with environmental
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triggers is replaced by an instinct, there is a sense of a transfer of meaning from phenotype to
genotype—from higher to lower levels of organization—despite the fact that materialistic changes
like movements of genes are confined to their respective levels (the phenotype does not actually
become a genotype). This will help us replace the notion of novelty from a local genetic accident
with the idea that novelty arises at the system level and is then crystallized in an evolutionary
process based on mutational operators working under natural selection. It also addresses, from an
unexpected direction, the fundamental question articulated by Levin of how the different scales
of biological organization are connected [90]. As Levin wrote: “change is taking place on many
scales at the same time, and... it is the interaction among phenomena on different scales that must
occupy our attention” [90].
2.4 The gradual evolution of innateness of alternative splicing patterns results
in exon shuffling
As an example, the above bears on the evolution of chimeric genes. Traditional discussions on the
evolution of chimeric genes seem to assume that they arise by sudden fortuitous events. In contrast,
I argue that, as further molecular evolutionary details are uncovered, we will see that such genes
are generated by a gradual process. The difference between these views is striking in the case of
the evolution of alternative splicing patterns, and here, it brings together various aspects of the
present view.
“Exon shuffling” refers to the fact that homologous exons can appear in different genetic contexts
in different species or even the same species. “Alternative splicing” refers to the fact that, in
eukaryotes, multiple products can be generated from different combinations of exons, whether the
exons are taken from nearby as in the case of cis-splicing, or from different loci as in the case
of trans-splicing. The former implies a process in evolutionary time. The latter is a process in
developmental time. Now, we know that there are cases where the same exons are being trans-
spliced in one species or strain but cis-spliced in another [79], such as the exons of the separate
eri-6 and eri-7 in C. elegans strain N2 and their fused homologs in C. briggsae and in other strains
of C. elegans [48]. Likewise, we know that some functions are achieved by multiple single-module
proteins in one species but by a single, multi-module protein in another, where the genetic sequences
encoding these modules are fused [59]. For example, the activities required for the synthesis of fatty
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acids from acetyl-CoA are carried on by discrete monofunctional proteins in most bacteria, and are
encoded by two unlinked genes in fungi [21, 113] and by a single multi-exon gene in animals [2] (see
[59]). While a connection between exon shuffling and alternative splicing was suggested as soon
as the latter was discovered [54], I offer to sharpen the nature of this connection as follows: exon
shuffling is the gradually evolved innate state of alternative splicing. Namely, what is constructed in
developmental time is gradually replaced in evolutionary time with new innate elements and a new
developmental construction. Specifically, when two exons previously spliced together at the RNA
level are now fused at the DNA level, it is a case where a process in developmental time—a splicing
pattern affected by various factors—has become an innate object—a gene fusion, emancipated from
the influence of those factors.
Accidental mutation and natural selection are not suitable for explaining this gradual evolution
of innateness of an alternative splicing pattern because it is a long term process that requires
multiple changes that interact with each other, each of which is hard to justify by a short-term
adaptive value. However, it can occur by mutational mechanisms operating under selection, as
discussed in section 2.1 and in [93]. One may hypothesize that alleles evolving at multiple loci
gradually change the regulation of the alternative splicing pattern in the focal gene as well as
in other, coevolving genes. Genetic information from these loci can then be gradually collected
by non-random mutation [93], setting the new genetic sequences as well as the new alternative
splicing patterns that we see today. In other words, many mutation-writing events, in each of
many individuals, in each of many generations, under natural selection, gradually pave the way for
network evolution at the gene level. Evolution is a process where many interacting changes happen
in parallel over long periods of time [93].
Two noteworthy precedents to the above are these. First, Stone and Schwartz hypothesized that
separate genes whose products first aggregated in the cytosol to form a functioning enzyme could
later become fused at the DNA level [133]. They suggested, as an example, that the different lobes of
an enzyme such as glyceraldehyde-3-phosphate dehydrogenase may have come from separate genes
far in the past, before those genes became genetically fused; and that this could also explain the
existence of a family of dehydrogenases, each of which has fused the same gene encoding the NAD
binding protein with differently mutated copies of the gene encoding the substrate binding domain.
Second, West-Eberhard [163] predicted that the connection between evolution and development will
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be found in the connection between exon shuffling and alternative splicing and in other phenomena;
and that somehow what undergoes genetic change during development is also more likely to undergo
evolutionary change [163]. In this paper, I agree with the above and add that the gene-fusion case
is merely an example of a more general principle, where meaning is absorbed from context by the
gradual change of strength of connections between nodes in a network.
2.5 Further insights from the evolution of language
In developing his ideas on evolution, Darwin drew inspiration, among else, from the evolution of
language. In The Descent of Man, he wrote: “The formation of different languages and of distinct
species, and the proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process, are curiously
the same... We find in distinct languages striking homologies due to community of descent, and
analogies due to a similar process of formation... We have in both cases the reduplication of parts,
the effects of long-continued use, and so forth” [26, pp.59-60]. Had Darwin known what we know
today about the evolution of language and molecular evolution, he would have been able to take
his analogy further, and show that principles analogous to those proposed above are essential not
only for biological evolution but also for the evolution of language.
Reminiscent of the ubiquity of cooption in biology, in the course of the evolution of language,
words change their meanings as well as adopt multiple meanings. For example, words for “sharp”
in different languages are related by descent to words for “tooth” or “shard” of clay, among else;
and third person pronouns like “he” or “she” across different languages are generally related to
pointing words for distant objects [32]. The change of meaning is pervasive and the principle of
cooption appears to account essentially for all of language [32].
Furthermore, the meanings of words generally change gradually, as the following example by
linguist Guy Deutscher demonstrates [32]. The word pair “going to,” in general and specifically in
the shorthand form “going [to some place in order] to [do something],” originally meant movement.
Gradually, the movement meaning was relegated to the background, while the implication that
something was soon about to happen has come to the fore, until “going to” has become a future
marker, independent of movement [32]. For example, a sentence from the mid 1400s tells of a travel
to some place: “As they were goynge to bringe hym there.” A later example reads: “was goyng
to be brought into helle,” where the passive form “to be brought” begins to shift the focus to the
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temporal realm [32]. Finally, after further such changes, an example from 1642 spoken by King
Charles I shows the phrase to mean specifically that something was soon going to happen, without
any implication of travel by the subject: ”My Magazine [arms] is going to be taken from Me”. At
that point it was recognized by a linguist as a future marker [32].
Note that it was not a sudden change in the words themselves that gave rise to the future
marker, but rather a gradual change of context of usage: the more people used the word-pair to
emphasize that an activity was soon to take place, the more it has come to be conceptualized in this
new meaning. The novelty arose at the system level. Note that there was a hint of the final meaning
already in the beginning—when we go somewhere in order to do something, it implies that we will
be doing it soon. This meaning was sharpened and gradually released from the previous usage,
leading at the end to an abstract concept that applies more broadly than before—to inanimate as
well as animate objects.
Note also that in this fusion of “going to,” “going” and “to” are in some sense duplicates of
“going” in the original sense of movement, as in “going to the store,” and of the “to” that is in “in
order to,” respectively—the latter are the source copies. In fact, in the slang word “gonna,” the
two words have actually fused in the sense that the space between the words as well as some sounds
have dropped. But it is important to notice that an essential part of the fusion had already happen
before these local changes, which demonstrates that we must attend to the gradually changing
context of usage as leading the process.
Indeed, not only do new words commonly arise from fusions, they often start with a metaphor
that, in the course of the evolution of language, gradually becomes routinized with its own stand-
alone meaning. For example, the Old English “hlaf weard” (loaf warden; i.e., bread keeper) has
gone through the stages of “hlaford,” “laferd,” “lowerd,” finally providing us the abstract “lord”
[32]. The Latin de-caedere, or “cut off,” has evolved into “decide” [32]. (Note the metaphor
between the literal meaning of “bread” and “keeper” on the one hand, and “lord” on the other, for
example.) Indeed, metaphor is a metaphor of itself, because it literally means carry across from one
context to another (meta: across; phor: carry) [32], which is our topic—cooption. Furthermore,
it is a common occurrence that when two words are used frequently and obligatorily together in
an emerging context, their independent existence in that context becomes irrelevant, and they are
shortened and fused into one word—which is reminiscent of the TRIM5-CypA fusion mechanism.
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The above provides also an analogy to innateness. In the beginning of the use of a pair of
words that are to become a word fusion, the pair is constructed using the ability of speakers to put
together previously learned words into combinations with their own meanings, and is understood
using the ability of listeners to analyze combinations in terms of the words they are made of. But
as the two words come to be used more and more frequently together in a certain emerging context,
they come to be perceived less and less as a constructed phrase and more and more as a word in
its own sake. That is, increasingly the new fusion is learned by children directly from the context
of its usage at the same time as other words are learned, rather than being constructed figuratively
during speech. Eventually it is hanging by its context alone. It is no longer constructed from units
more elementary than itself, but is a new elementary unit with its own literal meaning. In this
quickening of the construction of the new fusion until it becomes an elementary unit there is a
metaphor for the evolution of innateness.
In summary, the new elements of language are not invented out of thin air. Rather, the source
for their creation preexists at the system level. One may say that an essential point about human
language is that it allows us to put together words into phrases and sentences that communicate
novel meaning; but note also that from these phrases and their contexts of usage, new words arise.
The vocabulary grows in a manner connected to word usage. And as this vocabulary grows, our
ability to express meanings is refined. Whereas previously “going to” had the explicit meaning of
travel and an implicit meaning of “soon,” now we have both, including a clear, separate meaning
of “soon” that is applicable in new situations. Thus, from the ambiguous that can play multiple
roles, come the distinct, diversified and specialized. The process “starts” at the system level.
2.6 Novelty comes neither from a point nor from DNA “misspelling”
Now, gene fusion may be discussed as one topic, and cooption as another. But they are actually
two sides of the same coin. In both cases we see elements or copies thereof leaving their previous
context and moving to a new context. But although fusion and cooption are parts of the same
process, the case of fusion is especially grabbing to the eye, because it shows the creation of a new
elementary unit in a manner that traditional theory has not prepared us for. In traditional theory,
there is point mutation and presumed novelty from it, and there is gene duplication followed by
point mutations in the duplicates [105], but there is no evolutionary process where a process can
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become an object—where a new elementary unit is created from something that previously was an
interaction (indeed, this new elementary unit absorbs new meaning from its gradually changing
context).
Two remarks are important. First, this manner of creating a new elementary unit requires
the existence of a hierarchical structure of organization—a network—where, by a gradual change
in the network, such a process can happen. Since this hierarchical structure does exist and is a
fundamental aspect of nature, it is an advantage of the present theory that it engages this structure6.
Second, the gradual creation of a new elementary unit from what was previously an interaction is
important because it shows us that the barrier between “unit” and “interaction” has been broken.
There is no sharp dividing line between elementary units and higher-level interactions. As with
the fact that the phrase “going to” never needs to become the fusion “gonna” in order to become
a word for all intents and purposes—a unified concept, automated and regulated as one—and as
there is no particular point in time where it suddenly turned from two words into one, so there is
no clear line telling us when two exons that interact need to be considered as making up one gene
as opposed to belonging to different genes [53]. The collapse of the gene concept as a well-defined
unit is supportive of this absence of a sharp division between process and object7 [53] and fits with
a gradual process of gene formation.
Indeed, the view proposed here is importantly different from the traditional one. Not only does
the traditional view focus on object minus context and claim that novelty arises in the object by a
local genetic accident that emanates this novelty “upward” to the complex system—novelty from a
point—but in addition, this point-like change is considered to be an error akin to a “misspelling.” If
we let genes be words, metaphorically speaking, and let the phenotype be the technology that they
describe, then the traditional notion of mutation can be exemplified by misspelling unintentionally
the word “incubator” while making all effort to copy the word “incubate” accurately, and thus sud-
6In contrast, in traditional theory, genes are often perceived as independent actors, and mutation is perceived as a
local genetic accident that brings new phenotypic meaning on its own. Traditional models do not have a representation
of the phenotype—of biological structure—and therefore treat genes more as beads on a string than as nodes in a
network. They are oblivious to what is happening above the bottom level of the biological hierarchy, and to the
possibility that from higher up comes a force that changes something at the bottom level. They simply assume that
the bottom level of the hierarchy is in control all on its own of what is happening evolutionarily, by means of random
mutation.
7We now know that genetic elements we previously thought to participate in “one” gene actually form products
together with elements that we previously thought to belong exclusively to “other” genes, and so the boundaries
between genes have been much blurred.
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denly getting the idea of inventing an incubator. Whereas in reality, the incubator (i.e., technology,
or the phenotype) is invented by the use of many concepts described by putting together many
words; and in the long-term, the whole complex object that is an incubator might even be given a
standard, symbolic name by which this whole has come to be referred to conveniently: the word
“incubator,” generated by a standard operation of adding the appropriate suffix to a preexisting,
useful word. From the view of interaction-based evolution, to say that the “misspelling” of genes
is the source of biological novelty is to make a mistake in understanding the nature and the role
of the bottom level of the genetic interaction hierarchy, similar to saying that the misspelling of
words creates technology.
2.7 Evolution is a bottomless system
Considering all the above, we can now describe a main point of this paper. Evolution is a “bot-
tomless system8.” One cannot define all words in the dictionary in terms of other words without
getting into a circularity. Ultimately, the meaning of words comes from the context of their usage;
that is how language is learned and even how it evolves. The genes are similar in this regard.
Their meaning comes from their context of usage. They themselves are nodes in a network, in
development as well as in evolution. The upshot of this is that the bottom of the hierarchy of
biological interactions—the genetic sequence—is not a stable ground upward of which life is built.
Mutation is not a local accident that brings innovation all on its own as though there is no living
network that it needs to connect to. The process of genetic change is a complex one where the
connections between nodes in the network become stronger and weaker as they form modules that
absorb meaning from context.
With this key, we will begin to replace the source of novelty in evolution. Traditionally, we have
been thinking about an accident, disconnected from the living network, as an event that creates new
information. This was conceived of as a point-like event, which then emanates the novelty that it
brings about to the phenotypic level. I argue instead that novelty arises from network-level change,
not from a point. This involves a mutation-writing phenotype that executes network change in a
syntactic and evolving fashion [93].
8This term, which aptly describes one of the most important points of this paper, was proposed by Nick Pippenger.
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3 Simplification and novelty
For Darwin as well as for Fisher [49], complexity evolved in cases where an increase in it was needed
for an increase in fitness. However, the question of why complexity evolves has never been resolved
[154, p. 11]. I argue here that simplification under performance pressure leads to both complexity
and novelty.
This section will be entirely devoted to discussing the concepts. Once they are discussed, the
numerous empirical examples given in section 4 can be understood.
3.1 Simplification under performance pressure leads to complexity
Several points in the present theory may be organized under the heading of “simplification,” each
of which comes with its own corresponding increase in complexity.
3.1.1 Modularity and simplification
• Simplification and modularity are tightly connected concepts. A module serves multiple
contexts—in fact it is defined by them—and in the case where one serves the many, as in the
case where one explains the many, there is frugality, parsimony, or simplification.
• I discussed above the gradual appearance of modules in networks. A key example of the
appearance of a module was the fusion of two genetic elements. Here, the developmental
process originally putting them together is simplified away in the course of evolution. More
generally, the gradual arising of new modules from a previously complex, interconnected mass
of nodes is the evolutionary streamlining, or simplification, of development. Elements inside
a module are emancipated from the complex influence of elements that are now outside of it
and are no longer connected to it.
3.1.2 Innateness and simplification
• As will be shown soon, an extension of the last point is the evolution of innateness, which in-
volves evolved independence from environmental triggers. During evolution, an evolving trait
can become emancipated from complex environmental influence involved in the development
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of an adaptive ancestral phenotype as a more orderly, simplified and compartmentalized de-
velopmental process evolves. Thus, the evolution of innateness involves simplification: what
consumed developmental (and sometimes learning) time is simplified away in the course of
evolution.
Now, the cases of simplification described above come together with an increase in complexity.
As argued earlier, due to the duplication of genes, the formation of a new module need not come
at the expense of old modules. The increase in the number of modules or elementary units comes
together with an increase in the number of interactions between such modules or units, which rep-
resents an increase in complexity. Simplification is what we see when we look at the modularization
of an interconnected mass, and complexity is what we see when we look at emerging interactions
involving newly formed modules. Local simplification leads to a global increase in complexity.
3.1.3 The final touch of perfection
There are observations that show the development of organs or tissues taking ever straighter paths
over evolutionary time [114]. For example, in cetacean embryos (e.g., whales and dolphins), hind
limb buds still appear fleetingly in development and grow to a small size before they are removed
[129]. In such cases, it is evident that, over evolutionary time, the developmental process gradually
comes to spend less and less time and energy on developing structure that is slated to be superceded
by another or to be removed later in development.
How does it happen that evolution straightens up developmental paths? A neo-Darwinian
answer is that the savings of time and energy are directly favored by natural selection, so that a
whale that acquires by chance a mutation that reduces the development of the useless bones by even
a small amount gains a slight benefit in terms of survival and reproduction, and thus accidental
mutations of this sort are passed on preferentially. We must ask, however, whether it is reasonable
that a slight straightening of the developmental path of useless, internal small bones is truly enough
to make such an impact on differential survival and reproduction that would be noticeable, when
presumably many and much more important other individual differences contribute to differential
success. Indeed, the problem of the obliteration of rudimentary organs is a very old one [25],
and was discussed by Weismann hand in hand with that of the final touch of perfection—how
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adaptations become perfected beyond what seems to be possible by traditional means [162]. Darwin
himself agreed that it was not possible to explain the removal of rudimentary organs as an outcome
of natural selection alone based on minute economic considerations [27]. Indeed, in light of the
sections to follow on innateness, it is remarkable that he held steadfastly to the Lamarckian “laws
of use and disuse” to explain them. And if Darwin is not neo-Darwinian enough to defend the
latter, then one may consider the father of neo-Darwinism, August Weismann—who is responsible
for the rejection of Lamarckism: How did he explain the final touch of perfection? By suggesting a
principle of “momentum” or “inertia,” where a mutation in a certain direction will be followed by
others in the same direction, so that noticeable, selected improvements of economy will be followed
up by minute, unselected ones [162]—a point which is completely outside of the view based on
random mutation and natural selection, a view which traces its ideological origins to Weismann.
It seems that no serious explanation was found for these phenomena within neo-Darwinism, and
indeed those who were supposed to be the two greatest pillars of it went to great lengths to look
for alternative explanations.
The theory proposed here tackles this old, unresolved problem head on. It argues that it is
not accidental mutation, but simplification, that explains the final touch of perfection, both in
the complete obliteration of a trait and in the crystallization of adaptation (see section 4.12.2).
In addition, Weismann’s idea of inertia is not beyond the pale for a theory where the writing of
mutations has evolved under the influence of past selection.
Now, notice again the connection between simplification and complexity: the intriguing straight-
ening of developmental paths demonstrated by the unexplained old observations is tied to the “final
touch of perfection”—a honing in on an optimum in the evolution of a complex adaptation.
3.1.4 Convergence, simplification and complexity
According to [93], the writing of mutations over the generations combines information from different
loci and from different individuals that succeeded in survival and reproduction. Alleles at different
loci concomitantly spreading in the population do not each bring an independent piece of the
phenotype to all individuals, but rather interact with each other. Thus, an adaptation evolves at
the level of the population as a whole, at the same time as it becomes more genetically stable [93].
This process slowly gives rise to the true, common reason for success shared by individuals, as the
22
initially many and highly variable ways by which different individuals approximate the adaptation
only roughly at first are gradually superseded by an adaptation, uniform across individuals (see
nest-digging by sand wasps, discussed in section 4.12.1 and in [93]). We may now note that in this
replacement of many by one—of the different rough approximations by one uniform adaptation—
there is simplification. At the same time, this one that replaces the many is a complex adaptation—a
point of optimality. Therefore, simplification and complexity again come together: the complexity
that is in the different ways of approaching an adaptation has been converted into the complexity
of the adaptation itself.
3.1.5 Simplification and complexity: summary
We have seen that each of the above connections to simplification comes together with an increase
in complexity. Could simplification under performance pressure (e.g., under selection) be the cause
of the evolution of complexity? This question is best answered together with another, related
question, discussed next: What is the source of novelty in evolution?
3.2 The problem of novelty
Lamarckian or “adaptive” mutation has been the only alternative so far to accidental mutation9,
but it has fundamental problems. First, it does not apply to multicellulars: there is no intra-
organismal mechanism that senses that the hawk needs sharper vision and then makes the genetic
changes in the germ cells needed to bring about that phenotypic change. Second, hypothetically
speaking, even if there were mutational mechanisms that knew what would have been favored by
natural selection in a particular organism at a particular point in time and how to produce it, this
would not have solved the problem of how novelty arises, because the novelty would have been in
how such supposed mechanisms acquired that particular knowledge to begin with. Indeed, it is easy
to erroneously think that, if there is knowledge of the thing to be produced, there is no novelty,
and if it is to be produced without knowledge, it must be produced by accident. Thus, we can
understand the immense attraction of accidental mutation from a traditional perspective: First,
it requires no impossible mechanism transferring knowledge from the macroscale to the genotype.
9As noted, the evolvability approach implicitly or explicitly relies on accidental mutation as the ultimate cause of
heritable novelty.
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Second, accident has no preconceptions, and it seems to have been believed that it can invent
almost anything—that it can produce novelty.
As articulated in [93], it is a key property of interaction-based evolution that the non-random
mutation that it proposes does not circumvent, but rather works together with, natural selection,
and is strictly non-Lamarckian. This removes the first reason to hold on to accidental mutation.
However, if the mutational mechanisms are not “aware” of the environment, how could mutation be
anything other than accidental? How could the ultimate source of novelty in evolution be anything
other than random mutation?
3.3 Simplification under performance pressure leads to novelty
To try to answer this question, let us allow ourselves to step outside of evolution and look at how
novelty arises in other creative processes.
Consider the development of scientific theories. It has two fundamental principles. First,
theories need to fit the data—they need to perform. Second, they must be parsimonious. When
we take disconnected facts and find a theory that explains them all in one, we create a more
parsimonious picture of reality than existed before. It is a fortunate fact of nature that when we
do so we often obtain a model of reality that will hold better when new and unexpected data later
arises and that will lead to findings not previously expected.
A well known example of the use of parsimony in science is the Copernican revolution—the
placing of the sun instead of the earth at the center of the solar system. Copernicus proposed this
model not because it allowed him to make better predictions of the movements of the planets, but
because it was simpler on an essential point [131]. This simpler model paved the way to future
science, generally fitting with major later findings by Kepler and Galileo, like the phases of Venus.
From this and many other examples we see that the pursuit of parsimony does not merely
provide elegance per se. Parsimony expectedly brings the unexpected—useful things that were not
initially predicted and were not the goal of the work, yet commonly appear as a result of work.
By simplifying under performance pressure we do not act randomly. Rather, we put work in, and
get novelty out: a new, useful prediction or connection emerges that was not originally expected.
Thus, it is not the case that either one knows one’s goal and there is no novelty in getting there,
or one does not know it and the only way to get there is by accident. Rather, there is a third way
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to novelty.
Several important comments follow. First, we need not explain why simplification under per-
formance pressure leads to novel, useful things in science that were not directly sought. For now,
we may simply take it as a grand fact.
Second, importantly, this simplification does not make science as a whole simpler but rather
more complex. As new theories connect between previously unconnected facts, new predictions and
new questions arise. The more knowns there are, the more they interact and expand our ability to
ask yet new questions. Thus, I argue that simplification under performance pressure leads to both
novelty and complexity.
Third, simplification and performance function together. As statisticians or investigators in
machine learning know, it is useless to make a model that predicts a given set of data points
perfectly if the model is overly complicated, as it is useless to set up a model that is very simple
but has nothing to do with the data. A balance must be maintained between fit to data and model
elegance, and to maintain it is an art.
Indeed, the desires for simplicity and for performance are conflicting: at the time when Galileo
originally favored the Copernican over the Ptolemaic system, he did it despite the fact that the
former fit the data a little worse, and because of the fact that it was much more parsimonious.
Indeed, later scientific research showed that the more parsimonious model was far more improvable.
The development of mathematics gives us a similar picture. It happened once and again in his-
tory that pure mathematicians working on the principles of aesthetics or parsimony have produced
things that years later were found to have unexpected utilitarian value [166, 61, 16]. Indeed, the
power of operations other than the test of performance in the growth of mathematical and scien-
tific knowledge has been amply demonstrated. We see it in simplification or parsimony, elegance or
aesthetics, symmetry, pattern completion and analogy [166, 61, 16]. I use the word “simplification”
in a very broad sense to refer to all these variants and the creative force they represent. Note
also that in both mathematics and science, we operate with a network of concepts. We connect
between ideas to create a fuzzy, new idea, distill a fuzzy new idea to its essence, and pursue the
consequences of a distilled idea to new connections (Christos Papadimitriou and Umesh Vazirani,
personal communications). Thus, novelty arises from the network, not from random, point-like
changes. This network change is driven by both simplification and performance, and we can see
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that it leads to complexity, novelty and improvement.
The evolution of technology is also illustrative. What is simple appears in many different
technologies. The concept of a disc appears in the potter’s wheel, in wheels for transportation, in
a round table, and in the cross section of a tree trunk. The concept of a sharp edge appears in a
stone tool, a peg, and even a shingle roof. Once we generate a functional but elegant object in one
context, it is going to have the inherent capacity of working well in future, different contexts.
I argue here that, also in biological evolution, simplification and performance pressure, and
not accidental mutation and performance pressure, drive complexity, novelty and advancement.
This new theory has an advantage over the previous one. When we rely on simplification under
performance pressure, we rely on something that we can see to be central to other creative processes.
A key aspect of simplification is that it allows us to circumvent the problem posed earlier: how
mutation can do anything useful, how it can be anything besides accidental, without “awareness”
of the environment and the macroscale phenotype. The solution is that biochemical work that sim-
plifies local connections in the genetic network requires no knowledge of the macroscale phenotype
and the environment, and can take place in the germ cells. That is, while local simplification and
gene duplication operations take place in the germ cells, natural selection evaluates the organism
as a complex whole, and together these two forces lead to novelty. This allows us to replace the
concept of accidental mutation with a concept of non-accidental mutation that is useful yet not
Lamarckian, and thus to replace the traditional notion of random mutation as the ultimate source
of novelty in evolution.
3.4 Where simplification and performance pressure happen
In addition to simplification pressure at the genetic level and performance pressure at the organismal
level, each of the two may have, at its own level, the other on the other side of the coin. For example,
in an ecological community, each species is pressing to produce more of itself and at the same time
is undoing the growth of others, thus pressing to simplify the ecological network. The same could be
said of a gene that comes to replace another in the course of evolution by usurping the other’s role,
a phenomenon called “genetic piracy” by Roth [126] (see also [154]). The ecological example above
clarifies that the implementation of simplification can be as basic and follow as naturally from the
situation as differential survival. In fact, here they are two sides of the same coin: inasmuch as the
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making more of one entity means making less of another, the performance of any one entity puts
simplification pressure on the network, and this principle may apply both to the ecological network
and to the genetic network. It is also noteworthy in this regard that a gene that is extensively used
(performs well) and therefore highly expressed may, due to mutational mechanisms, be more likely
to be duplicated. This will be relevant in section 5.4.
4 The problem of innateness
It is time to substantiate the ideas proposed in this paper with many examples from the phenotypic
level. This section will do so with the help of empirical observations relating to one of the oldest
and most mysterious problems in evolution—the problem of the evolution of innateness. Although
the observations to be discussed are each known and available in the literature, here I will argue for
their fundamental importance in evolution through a connection with interaction-based evolution. I
will first cover innateness from multiple angles in sections 4.1–4.11, and then discuss the emergence
of novelty in detail (section 4.12.2). Readers interested in the molecular level may note that it will
be revisited in section 5.
4.1 The problem of the preexistence of high-level mechanisms
The ability of pointer dogs to point at the prey in a statuesque manner (among other abilities) is to a
large degree innate [4]. How did this instinct evolve? To argue that a sequence of random mutations
of small effects has built up the behavior from scratch such that it has always been instinctive and
never learned is unappealing: Would breeders have recognized slight inborn tendencies to point
at the beginning of the evolutionary process involved and, without regard for the outcome of any
training, base their artificial selection on these differences? And if training was important in the
evolution of pointing, the highly evolved abilities of the animal to learn would have masked out
presumed mutations of slight effect for an independently developed instinct. All would be more
understandable if we consider that a trait that previously required learning through reward and/or
punishment has become emancipated in the course of evolution from these external cues.
Consider the evolution of migration. In an instinctive and automatic manner, a young com-
mon cuckoo (Cuculus canorus) takes off in the fall from its breeding grounds in Scandinavia, flies
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thousands of miles to its wintering site in Central Africa and then returns in the spring [167]. How
did this complex suite of instincts get started in evolution? Both Darwin [125] and Wallace [156]
hypothesized that the breeding and wintering grounds gradually became separated and the distance
between them increased; that originally, the animals were tracking seasonal changes in resources
over short distances as a direct response to the environment; and that in time this behavior has
become habitual and instinctive [125, 156] (see also [169]). To assume that the migratory instinct
evolved afresh, independently of the behavior that came before it, brings up the same problem as
in the case of the pointer dogs: the pre-existence of an evolved, general-level mechanism (in this
case, the brain) that is able to respond adaptively to environmental changes and was presumably
involved in the original phenotype.
In an experiment designed to capture the evolution of innateness [148] (see also [149, 153, 151,
9, 8]), Waddington took Drosophila melanogaster flies and exposed their pupae to a heat shock.
As a result, a fair number of the flies that developed showed a particular vein pattern on their
wings—an absence of or a gap in the posterior crossvein and sometimes the anterior one too—called
“crossveinless.” He then bred the crossveinless flies to form the next generation of the experiment
and repeated this procedure of heat shock and selective breeding over the generations. As a result,
the percentage of crossveinless flies increased over the generations and, beginning at generation 14, a
small percentage of flies started showing the new vein pattern without exposure to heat shock, that
is, innately10 [148]. The fact that this trait became innate, when no selection for such innateness
had been performed, is an intriguing experimental outcome called “genetic assimilation” [148].
To explain genetic assimilation, Stern [132] (see also [41]) proposed a model based on traditional
principles. The model assumes the preexistence of alleles that make independent contributions
toward a certain sum, such that if the sum surpasses a certain threshold, the trait of interest
is exhibited. Furthermore it makes certain assumptions about the initial frequencies of alleles
and the normal conditions and experimental conditions thresholds that make it so that, prior to
selection, the trait of interest (e.g., crossveinless) is exhibited in practice only under experimental
conditions (e.g., heat shock), whereas post selection it is exhibited under both experimental and
normal conditions, and thus the trait can be said to have become innate. However, despite its
10In order to observe this, the experimenters took at each generation a certain sample of flies and raised them
without heat shock.
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mathematical crispness, taken literally, this model means that every trait that is to become innate
has its own set of additive alleles that preexist and provide the potential for that trait to become
innate as is. That is, there are additive alleles that, if they surpass a threshold, build a brain
that points, and there are different sets of additive alleles lying dormant in birds for every possible
migration route, such that each set builds a brain for a particular route if it surpasses a certain
threshold11. Indeed, Waddington himself rejected this model [150, 152], because it did not apply
to the complex cases that motivated the problem. Here, I will provide another explanation for
innateness based on network evolution.
4.2 Modularity and innateness are caused by simplification
As Waddington alluded to [147], when an emerging module is released from the influence of an
element inside the organism, the result is seen as modularization; and when it is released from the
influence of an environmental factor, the result is seen as the evolution of innateness. Earlier I
argued that simplification is connected to modularity and innateness: the formation of modules
streamlines the developmental process and involves emancipation of an emerging module from
complex influences, both internal and external. Indeed, simplification leads to modularity and
innateness.
Approaching the topic of innateness equipped with the theory of gradual network change pre-
sented here, it is useful to distinguish between two important phenomena that I will call “eman-
cipation” and “acceleration.” Emancipation refers to the fact that nodes (modules or elements)
can be copied and the connections between nodes can gradually evolve such that a node can be
subjected to a different regulation than that of its source copy. Acceleration refers to the idea
that the coming together of nodes under one control simplifies development locally while absorbing
novel phenotypic meaning from the changing context. Both these aspects of network level evolu-
tion, discussed in section 2.3, will be clarified with the help of examples, and both figure into the
explanation of innateness to be given in the following sections.
11In fact, once we assume that Stern’s model taken at face value is the relevant method of explanation, it would
have been easier to assume that complex instincts in nature evolve afresh, without relation to a preexisting behavior
modulated by a brain and modified by the environment, because the model does not describe a world where such a
relation is biologically reasonable—it requires a brain that affects independently threshold expediently assumed for
each particular trait that is to become innate, each with its own expediently assumed set of additive alleles.
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4.3 The evolution of innateness is more common than we realize because the
innate, derived phenotype is usually not identical with its non-innate, an-
cestral source
In an idealized view of the crossveinless experiment, we can think of the crossveinless trait as
qualitative (present or absent) and assume that it is the same in the beginning of the experiment
as it is at the end. The only thing that evolves under this assumption is the propensity to produce
it. In this case, we may simply use the word “emancipation” to describe what happens to the
crossveinless trait when it comes to appear without the environmental trigger. But crossveinless is
an extreme, chosen for its simplicity. In nature, when the evolution of innateness or emancipation
takes place, the trait that is to become innate also evolves at the same time. For example, in cases
of ritualization, a non-signaling behavior is gradually released from its context and becomes used
as a signal (e.g., an egg-fanning movement becomes a showing-the-nest signal [136]; see section
4.6) [67, 165, 5, 137]. As Tinbergen noted, those ritualized traits that are emancipated are usually
traits that have already changed much from their original form; and we would not have been able
to make a connection between the signal and its origin if it were not for the fact that, at least in
some cases, there happened to be a transitional series betraying the connection between the two,
such as in the threat posture of the Manchurian crane (Grus japonensis) [96, 137]. In other words,
there exists a continuum of differences between the non-innate ancestral and the innate derived
traits, that ranges from no difference, to a great difference that obscures the connection between
the ancestral and the derived; and cases at the former end of the spectrum are rare.
I argue that this is precisely the problem with observing innateness. Darwin and other early
naturalists believed that what is habitually performed due to environmental triggers over the gen-
erations gradually impresses itself on the hereditary constitution of the species and becomes innate
and emancipated from the environment, and that this is explained by the laws of use and disuse,
or Lamarckism [125, 25]. I argue that such automatization happens in general but is often hard to
see because of the difference between the ancestral and derived traits past the point of cooption,
and that it is network-level evolution and not Lamarckism that is responsible for it.
A spectrum of differences between the new innate and the old non-innate is predicted by
interaction-based evolution. If we do not recognize this spectrum, we are liable to notice only
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the easily visible cases at one end of it and then falsely argue that because of their rarity we
can continue business as usual. However, it is better to recognize that what we easily see of this
spectrum is its extreme, which is the tip of the iceberg.
4.4 Evolution of the whole as a whole in innateness
The fact that a trait changes as it becomes innate allows us to examine the evolution of a complex
whole, while involving not only emancipation but also welding and acceleration.
While I have been using the term “innate” without qualification so far, it is useful to note
that there is no strict separation between the innate and the non-innate. Learning itself is enabled
by instinct [99, 55]. No trait develops in a manner that is independent of the innate nature of
the organism, and no trait develops entirely independently of the environment, when the latter is
broadly construed [87]. Therefore, rather than speaking of “innate” and “non-innate,” we realize
that there is a continuum between things developed more directly and quickly (“innate”) and things
that require more unfolding that involves more interactions with the environment.
When we consider this continuum as it applies to a given organism, we should consider that it
evolves as a whole—the process of development evolves as a whole. Then, we can bring the ideas
of gradual network evolution to bear on it. I argue here that the evolution of innateness arises as
a result of the “chunking” or modularization of a previously complex part of the network—what
were previously independent elements each under a different control have now become simplified or
combined into a singe unit. Although it may seem that this simplification accelerates development
in the course of evolution toward the final trait, in general, development is not accelerating toward
the final trait as it was before, but rather toward what that trait has in the meantime changed
into, and therefore nothing is being accelerated strictly speaking. Therefore, it is the signature of
the previously less innate that we generally see in the current more innate, rather than a direct
facsimile. There is no Lamarckian transmission that takes a developed or a learned trait and makes
it innate. As argued in section 2.3, to use a metaphor, in an Archimedes screw, water is moved
along the shaft even though each point in the screw only rotates at its own level. So in evolution, the
non-innate does not itself become innate—the phenotypic does not become genotypic—but rather
evolutionary action at each level of biological organization remains at that level, while accelerating
development.
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We know that the adult form influences the evolution of the earlier stages of development: there
is selection on the adult form, and therefore there is selection on earlier stages of development to
lead to a well-performing adult. When considered from a traditional standpoint, this trivial point
turns into a problem because development is a complex process, and traditional evolutionary theory
is not equipped to deal with a complex process. Traditional evolutionary theory cannot conceive
of a complex evolutionary change that modifies the developmental process as a complex whole: it
does not have a sense of acceleration12 or an emphasis on emancipation, and therefore when a trait
appears earlier in development that seems to relate to one that used to come later in development
(e.g., innate migration relates to earlier, learned migration), it absurdly has to invoke an evolution
of that trait afresh, absent any connection to that which it obviously relates to. While Gould
attempted to address this problem, he did so by breaking the whole again into parts and arguing
that the timing of appearance of one part or a developmental process in and of itself can be moved
earlier or later in development [56], which is a very limited explanation that does not address the
range of phenomena discussed here.
I have presented, in contrast, a view of the evolution of the whole as a whole. Instead of the
evolution “afresh” idea that arises from a traditional perspective, this view raises the notion of
acceleration as described. The quicker arriving at an evolving developmental outcome has the
appearance of the evolution of innateness, thus involving interaction-based, network-level evolution
in innateness. We have seen this in the case of the TRIM5-CypA fusion and the evolution of
alternative splicing patterns at the molecular level, and will now see it in many examples at the
phenotypic level.
4.5 Pointing in pointer dogs as an example of the importance of the complex
whole in innateness
Pointing in pointer dogs will serve as an example of the importance of the evolution of the whole as
a whole in innateness. I propose that selection has operated on the outcome of the training, favoring
hunting dogs whose behavior following training was more pleasing to their owners, specifically in
stopping upon discovery of the prey instead of chasing it further. However, since innate tendencies
guide the learning, this selection has operated indirectly on innate tendencies, favoring dogs with
12but see the lively debate in the 19th century on it [56].
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the right set of innate tendencies that were more naturally inclined to learn the right behavior.
In particular, I hypothesize that there exists among animals a widespread, natural tendency to
heed sudden changes; that in pointer dogs, this tendency has been strengthened in the course
of evolution, in particular by heightening nervousness; and that other instincts have become at
the same time adjusted to direct it productively, helping the dogs to learn to pause and freeze
at the sight of prey. Over the generations, the learning task has become more and more natural
to the dogs, and the amount of learning required has decreased, until today, the dogs require
only minimal training, and they sometimes point at objects innately without any learning, as
Darwin observed [28]. Thus, selection for an improved outcome of the learning was accompanied
by an acceleration of the learning and, ultimately, innateness. This hypothesis, presented here
in its specific form that applies to pointer dogs, already has the advantage that it explains also
the nervousness syndrome that often afflicts these dogs: heightened nervousness helps them heed
sudden changes, and when not properly compensated for results in the nervousness syndrome.
Note that, while Grandin and Deesing [58] argued before that pointing relates to nervousness, their
discussion seems to assume that pointing and nervousness are traits with separate genetic causes
that happen to be connected through genetic linkage, which suggests a spurious connection. In
contrast, the hypothesis proposed here connects pointing and nervousness at a deep level, with the
help of the holistic view of interaction-based evolution. There are no genes dedicated to pointing
per se: pointing is a system-level phenomenon that emerges from a suite of interacting instincts
and learning.
In an exceptionally inspiring chapter, Papaj has already argued that what is first learned can
come over evolutionary time to be learned more quickly until it eventually becomes innate [121].
In this respect, his hypothesis is similar to the above. However, lacking the ideas of interaction-
based evolution, and treating instinct and learning as separate elements, he tried to create a model
of a traditional kind, and admitted that the model failed to provide an explanation, because the
evolution of innateness came out of an artificiality built into it [121]. In contrast, the hypothesis
presented here allows us to preserve Papaj’s intuition but in a natural way: it holds that selec-
tion has affected interacting instincts that guide the complex process of development and learning
through a process of network-based evolution, and network evolution involves acceleration and
emancipation—an increase in the innate abilities. In addition, interaction-based evolution also ex-
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plains why innateness and stereotypy are deeply intertwined (see sections 4.10, 4.11), which Papaj’s
model does not [121].
To reiterate, I propose that the process of evolution toward a better outcome of the learning
leads at the same time to a quickening of the learning and that ultimately, a new innate trait
appears, because what enables the organism to reach a better outcome through learning is that it
is naturally inclined in the right direction. The organism “gets it” more, naturally and inherently,
because underlying interacting instincts are being shaped. Thus, improvement comes together with
innateness.
Importantly, the evolutionary process that shapes the network of underlying instincts can be
seen as uncovering better “principles” that guide the learning (and more generally, development)—
emerging underlying elements that organize a preexisting complex more simply. Consistent with
section 3 and with later sections (see section 4.12.2), viewing things in terms of such principles
leads us to a new prediction regarding novelty: the evolution of the new innate and the new and
improved adult form will come together with the production of new, beneficial things that were
not selected for in and of themselves but arose as corollaries or windfalls of figuring out the right
principles. Improvement, innateness, and generalization—or the emergence of useful novelty not
selected for—come together. As an example, backing in pointer dogs13 may have evolved as a
“corollary”—an unintended but desirable outcome.
4.6 Elements of network evolution: chunking, emancipation and rigidification
As noted, ritualization is an evolutionary process that occurs when a behavioral element is gradually
emancipated from its original use as it becomes coopted for use as a signal in the course of evolution
(see, among else, [67, 165, 5, 137] and further references below). For example, when a bird is about
to hop or take flight, it bends its legs, lowers its breast, raises its hind parts and sometimes its
tail, folds its neck and brings its head back almost to the shoulders, while slightly expanding its
wings, so that the whole body is like a tight spring ready to be released for jumping, at which
instant the legs straighten, the breast and hind parts line up with the direction of the jump, and
the neck is stretched forward. In an ethology classic, Daanje [24] argued that, from this movement,
13“Backing” refers to the fact that these dogs copy the posture of another dog who is on point; even this behavior,
which is of use to the hunters, is strongly innate.
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various signals have evolved. For example, when the male turkey displays to the female, it raises
the hindparts a bit, raises and spreads its tail, folds its neck and brings its head back almost to
the raised back feathers, and partly spreads its wings downwards. This posture imitates that of
the jump in several elements, except that the legs are not bent, the tail and wing movements are
exaggerated, and the posture is kept frozen for a while [24]. Thus, a behavioral pattern which is
widespread taxonomically and which originally had a mechanical function has evolved into a signal
that is expressed in new contexts independently of the context of expression of the ancestral trait.
Another example of ritualization is the way that the male three-spined stickleback (Gasterosteus
aculeatus) shows the nest entrance to the female. According to Tinbergen, this movement was
derived from the egg fanning movement [136], which again demonstrates a shift from one context
to another.
As we have just seen, ritualization requires emancipation from one context and cooption to
another. Critically, these are operations of network evolution. The gradual release of an element
from one context concomitant with the subjecting of it to another context involves two aspects of
the organism at once and is inherently an interactive operation, well-described by modules moving
in a network. It is not well described by the traditional notion of evolution as a process affecting
“one thing at a time.”
Baerends’s work on nest building, egg laying and offspring provisioning in the digger wasp
Ammophila adriaansei (campestris) [6] demonstrates clearly that behavior is underlain by a network
of modules. A normal behavioral sequence of the wasps is as follows: Build a nest; close the entrance
temporarily with soil; fly away and hunt a caterpillar; carry the paralyzed caterpillar back; reopen
the nest; put the caterpillar in; lay an egg; close the entrance again, this time with greater care.
Now build another nest and repeat the entire process so far. Now return to the first nest; open the
closure; make an inspection visit. If the egg has hatched and the nest is in order, close the entrance,
and now bring 1-3 caterpillars in succession. Repeat this second phase for the second nest. Now
return to the first nest, open the closure and make an inspection visit. If all is in order, bring 3-7
caterpillars in succession; then make an especially careful final closure of the nest entrance. Repeat
this third phase for the second nest. Now build another nest, and repeat all from the beginning.
Furthermore, if, in the first inspection described above, the egg has not hatched, the wasp may
build another nest at that time. It can manage 4 nests at a time, with offspring at different ages at
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each nest requiring different amounts of provisioning (based on information obtained in inspection
visits). If a nest has been disturbed, the wasp may abandon it.
A computer programmer would instantly recognize that the digger wasp’s behavior is an al-
gorithm with subroutines (see flow chart in Figure 3). The most parsimonious description of this
behavior involves activation of the same behavioral modules or subroutines, such as “carry a cater-
pillar to nest” or “perform an inspection visit” in different contexts, and the different contexts,
namely the different stages of laying and provisioning, themselves consist of different combinations
of lower-level behavioral modules [102].
Interestingly, Tinbergen wrote that the process underlying emancipation was not known, though
it must somehow involve natural selection [137]. The present theory highlights how correct he was
to emphasize that unknown. At once we can understand the inability of traditional evolutionary
theory to explain empirical observations from ethology: A network is defined by interactions. The
evolution of a network is the evolution of a complex whole. The conceptualization of evolution
based on traditional theory encouraged a one-trait-at-a-time type of thinking and was not suit-
able for discussing network evolution and the transfer of an element from one context to another.
Importantly, Tinbergen also noted that there is no point during emancipation at which a behav-
ioral element stops belonging to its original function and starts belonging to a new function [137].
Rather, as in the evolution of language and in the verbal model of network evolution discussed
earlier, the change of context and meaning is gradual.
Let us now think about the evolution of a network such as described by Baerends. Obviously,
elements were not added to it in the form in which they exist today. For example, the construction
of a well-shaped nest with a cell at the end had been preceded by a less involved modification
of the environment. Also, elements were not appended in the course of evolution at the end of
the behavioral sequence. That is, if “build nest”, “make closure,” “hunt caterpillar,” etc., are
denoted a, b, c, etc., then it is patently obvious that the stages of evolution did not proceed in the
following sequence: a, ab, abc, etc., or else absurdities arise such as not laying eggs until a certain
point in evolution, performing an inspection visit before the existence of a foraging stage where
information from this visit is used, etc. This means that the behavioral sequence was reorganized in
the course of evolution and/or new elements were added at internal spots in the sequence. It follows
that elements that came after spots into which new or preexisting elements were inserted, or from
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which preexisting elements were removed or translocated, must have been emancipated from their
previous triggers (namely the completion of the behavioral steps that used to come before them)
and subjected to new triggers (the completion of the behavioral steps that come before them now).
Finally, we would not assume that each repeating element or subroutine evolved afresh in its entirety
for each instance in the sequence in which it is used. This means that there has been a copying of
routine calls, or, to use more generic terms, copying and differentiation of modules. Thus, operators
of network evolution—emancipation, cooption, copying and differentiation of modules—have been
involved in the evolution of digger wasp behavior.
Another example showing the insertion of elements at internal points in a sequence and sequence
reordering is Lorenz’s study of display sequences in surface feeding ducks [98]. Lorenz found about
20 behavioral elements, of which different combinations make different display sequences in different
species and even within the same species. Lorenz [98] describes the study of three different species,
the mallard, the European teal (Anas crecca) and the gadwall (Anas strepera), which share the
following 10 elements:
1. Initial bill-shake
2. Head-flick
3. Tail-shake
4. Grunt-whistle
5. Head-up-tail-up
6. Turn toward the female
7. Nod-swimming
8. Turning the back of the head
9. Bridling
10. Down-up movement
He then presents some display sequences (where one element follows another in quick succession)
for each of the three species. For the mallard:
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• 3,2,3
• 1,4,3
• 5,6,7,8
For the European teal:
• 3,2,3
• 10
• 4,3,2,5,6,8
For the gadwall:
• 4,3,2,3
• 5,6;10,6
(the semicolon mark between sequences 5,6 and 10,6 in the gadwall means that they are welded
at high excitation, which suggests, by connection with many other observations, that we are ob-
serving them in the midst of a process of evolutionary welding [98].)
The sequences above are obligatory and innate. Hybrids produce their own sequences. This
clearly shows network-level evolution in the sense of reorganization of modules, emancipation and
welding at the level of sequences of fixed action patterns (FAPs).
Critically, this example and the previous ones show us that the picture that we obtain by looking
closely at evolution at the phenotypic level mirrors what the molecular biological and genomic rev-
olutions have taught us about the genetic level: both at the molecular and at the phenotypic levels,
network-level evolution is key. And network-level evolution is much better understood with the
help of the principles of interaction-based evolution, including cooption, emancipation, acceleration
and simplification.
Welding, like emancipation, is also a network-evolution operation. While Baerends’s and
Lorenz’s examples above demonstrate it at the level of sequences of FAPs, welding can also generate
elements at a lower level, namely the FAP itself; though—critically—and in accord with our earlier
discussion of network evolution at the molecular level—there is no sharp boundary between the
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FAP and sequences thereof. One telling example was the inciting ceremony in ducks [101, 98, 100]
described in section 2.2: To-and-fro movements of the female duck, originally triggered by sepa-
rate environmental stimuli, have gradually fused in evolution and have become triggered as one,
while becoming emancipated from the presence of neighbors. These movements originally were a
territorial behavior, with an indirect, implied meaning of pair-bonding and team work, and as they
fused, the pair-bonding meaning crystallized and moved to the fore [101, 98, 100]. In fact, many
related examples exist; for instance, the territorial marking in the fire-mouth cyclid, Cichlasoma
meeki. The tendency to attack a neighbor when in one’s own territory and flee from the neighbor
when in the neighbor’s territory is indeed a very general one, spanning birds, fish and mammals.
In some fish, the neighbors exchange chase and be-chased turns, coincident with crossing the terri-
torial boundary [102]. In the fire-mouth cyclid, this chase and be-chased movement has become a
highly rhythmic oscillation—it has become stereotyped. The welding of the previously separately
triggered back-and-forth movements in this species is revealed when one fish suddenly loses interest
and disengages yet the other continues oscillating [102].
It is due to the highly surprising nature of these examples that Lorenz has been accused of
Lamarckian thinking, even though he rejected it. The problem is that traditional evolutionary
theory is not network based, and thus it has been impossible to properly conceptualize these
examples from its perspective.
4.7 Generalizing beyond ritualization: the automatic nature of instinct
The following examples not only show that welding and other elements of network evolution extend
beyond ritualization but also demonstrate the automatic nature of instinct. Consider, for example,
the pecking instinct in domestic chicks. This FAP is present at birth and consists of three main
elements: lunging the head, opening and closing the beak, and swallowing [87]. Since we would not
assume that these three elements of the fixed action pattern have each evolved from scratch in the
context of this FAP, we are forced to assume that they have been welded.
The classic example of a FAP—egg rolling in the greylag goose (Anser anser)—also shows
welding. Upon seeing an egg placed by the side of its nest, the goose stretches its neck in a
particular fashion, places its beak over the egg, and then slowly rolls the egg back into the nest
while performing balancing sideways motions with the beak to prevent the egg from slipping from
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the side [103]. This seems like an insightful sequence of operations, but in fact, when the egg is
quickly pulled out from under the beak while in motion, the goose will continue to roll the remaining
nothingness all the way to completion and tuck it under [103], again showing the automatic nature
of instinct.
Indeed, it is implicit in Barlow’s definition of the FAP (fixed action pattern) that the FAP is
a welding of elements in general [7]. Barlow’s definition of the FAP, which he renamed “modal
action pattern” (MAP), is that it consists of a behavioral module usually indivisible but made of
elements that appear individually elsewhere. Relatedly, Lorenz had suggested [98] that “perhaps all
behavioral patterns” arise from welding such as seen in the inciting example.
4.8 Ritualization shows all elements of network evolution in one
Interestingly, a single case of ritualization often exemplifies multiple or even all of the following
characteristics: emancipation (also: routinization, autonomization, or evolution of innateness),
cooption, chunking (or welding), increased efficiency, exaggeration (or caricaturization), schema-
tization, simplification, stereotypy, automatization and rigidification [67, 165, 5, 137]. Notably,
traditional theory has only offered to explain one or another of these phenomena in separate from
the others. For example, Maynard-Smith and Harper [108] suggested that stereotypy evolved be-
cause it standardizes competition, which not only ignores the co-occurrence of the many elements
above-mentioned, but also ignores the fact that stereotypy exists also in non-signaling instincts. In
contrast, it is striking that interaction-based evolution unifies all of these observations under one
umbrella, as outlined below:
• Emancipation. Emancipation (the release of a module from previous influences), or the
evolution of innateness, is clearly demonstrated by the examples above, and has been ad-
dressed here as a part of interaction-based (or network-based) evolution. The same is true
for chunking—the combining or welding of modules—which is also a part of network-based
evolution.
• Simplification. A fundamental concept in ethology is that of the “sign stimulus”—the
stimulus that elicits a fixed action pattern. Here, “sign” means “simple”: the sign stimulus
obtained its name from the fact that the animal attends only to a very limited part of the
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situation that we know it to be capable of perceiving through its senses. Namely, it attends to
a parsimonious summary of the situation—a key. Yet the simplicity of the key is only relative:
it is still a complex whole, a pattern involving relations between elements [139, 97, 82, 136].
For example, the gaping response of nestling Turdus merula as soon as they open their eyes can
be directed at a model consisting of a mere three discs that touch each other. However, it is
preferentially directed toward one of the discs that bears the right size-relation to another disc,
such that the two together can be interpreted as head and body [139]. As another example,
an abstract cross-like model (including symmetrical anterior and posterior “wing” edges, and
central short and long protrusions perpendicular to them) elicited an escape response from
young birds, but only when it is moved in the direction of the short end of the cross, as only
in this case the short end can be interpreted as a short neck, which is the case for birds of
prey [97, 82, 136]. In other words, an abstract combination of elements is the evolved key.
Now, Tinbergen argued that evolved rituals, which are themselves stimuli eliciting behavior
in others, have been “schematized” through evolution and are evolved sign stimuli [137].
Thus, he implied that rituals (and I will add the reception of signals, the “innate releasing
mechanism,” or IRM [102]) have been evolutionarily simplified to their complex essence.
• Exaggeration. Ritualized signals are often exaggerated, as in the case of throwing the
neck over one shoulder and then the other during inciting in the golden-eye (section 2.2).
Although it has been suggested that exaggeration has evolved under natural selection for
visual clarity, it is questionable that organisms would need such a degree of clarity14. I
argue that exaggeration is related to “caricaturization” or “schematization” (terms used in
the literature) and the final touch of perfection (section 3.1.3), and evolves by simplification
under performance pressure (section 3).
• Stereotypy. Stereotypy—or the lack of variation between individuals in a certain trait, or
even between different instances of the behavior in the same individual—is another prominent
aspect of rituals. According to interaction-based evolution, stereotypy is an inherent aspect
of evolution, as will be discussed in section 4.10.
14As an example of the animals’ acute discriminatory abilities, a herring gull can recognize its mate among a group
of other gulls from 30 yards away [136]
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• Cooption. Cooption is inherent to Tinbergen’s definition of ritualization, as noted (a non-
signaling behavior is coopted as a signal) and is also a crucial part of network-level evolution.
Thus, interaction-based evolution provides a much more parsimonious view of ritualization than
traditional theory, which provides both additional support for the present theory and an improved
conceptual understanding of ritualization.
4.9 Network evolution, language evolution and phenotypes
In the model of network evolution (section 2.3), I argued that two genetic elements that previously
were regulated by two separate lines of controls and had to be separately expressed before coming
together in an interaction can, over evolutionary time, gradually come together under one control
and even fuse to form a new gene. In this process, there is not only emancipation (one or both of
these elements is emancipated from what previously controlled it) but also a sense of automatization,
innateness and acceleration, as the emerging unit is no longer constructed from its elements by
developmental interactions but rather has been evolutionarily accelerated into a ready-made unit
or gene.
We can now see that the phenotypic-level examples from the previous sections that demon-
strate emancipation and cooption also demonstrate the evolution of innateness, automatization,
and acceleration, as expected. In the pecking instinct of domestic chicks, for instance, the lunging
of the head, the opening and closing of the beak, and the swallowing, have been welded together.
Therefore, the last two elements follow the first one now automatically, even though they must have
been originally triggered separately by the environment. Furthermore, this welded instinct appears
soon after hatching, and perhaps to some degree in the embryo [87, 83, 84], demonstrating the
evolution of innateness and acceleration. In the case of egg rolling in the greylag goose, the initial
stimulus from the egg suffices to trigger the entire motion of the beak that performs rolling all the
way back to the nest even if the egg is removed during its journey. And in the inciting ceremony,
the evolutionary process has emancipated the to and fro movements from environmental triggers,
welded them together and put them under the control of one trigger, resulting in the evolution of
innateness, and has brought the pair-bonding meaning to the fore (section 2.2).
Finally, in the evolution of language, we saw that a pair of words can gradually acquire new
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meaning from the gradual change of the context of its usage, and at the same time can begin to
be perceived and learned directly as a new word (word fusion) or concept in and of itself; whereas
previously the emerging meaning of it had to be constructed from other words that had to be
learned earlier. In this process, there is not only emancipation of the word fusion from its previous
context but also a sense of acceleration of the learning of the meaning of the word fusion. This
acceleration amounts to automatization of the new concept, which is no longer constructed from
other, more elementary units. Thus, the concepts of network-based evolution and the absorption
of meaning from context are central to genetic evolution, phenotypic evolution and more.
4.10 Stereotypy and the evolution of complex phenotypes: the process by which
phenotypes become fixed
Interaction-based evolution holds that selection continually operates on complex interactions be-
tween alleles across loci [93]. Thus, mutations do not generally bring independent pieces of the
phenotype from the individuals in which they originated to all, as they are required to under tra-
ditional natural selection. Instead, they interact, and the phenotype evolves at the level of the
population as a whole [93, 95]. It follows that, as some genetic variation across loci gradually
disappears (even while new genetic variation appears elsewhere), the phenotypic variation that it
caused due to the sexual shuffling of the genes disappears, and thus, over the generations, par-
ents and offspring gradually become more similar to each other. In other words, interaction-based
evolution necessitates that a trait gradually becomes stabilized at the level of the population as
a whole—it becomes “fixed” at the phenotypic level. This concept, called “convergence” in [93],
shows us that if evolution is based on interactions between alleles across loci, then it must involve
stabilization and therefore stereotypy as an inherent part of the process.
If traits are gradually stabilized in such manner, then it follows that we should see a continuum
of phenotypic fixedness corresponding to the formation of traits, with different traits lying at present
at different points along that continuum. Some traits, still early in the process of formation, will
appear as less stereotyped, and others, at later stages in the process, will appear as more so. Thus,
through this lens, stereotypy can be viewed as an indication of the degree of evolutionary progress
of a trait.
An example is provided again by the pointers. Darwin wrote that the hunting behaviors that
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characterize the pointers are basically innate, and that the only difference between them and “true
instinct” is that they are “less strictly inherited” in that there is variation in the individuals’ “degree
of inborn perfection” and therefore in the extent to which they require training [125, p.237]. Indeed,
pointing in a statuesque manner, backing other dogs and other hunting-relevant behaviors have all
been observed to occur often in pups that have not had the opportunity for learning by instruction,
imitation or experience, and they are not exhibited immediately or to the same degree in all pups
[4]. When training is required, the amount of training required is small: the trainer only guides the
dog toward expressing what it has already a strong natural tendency to express [4]. The existence of
variation in pointing behavior becomes eminently natural from the perspective of interaction-based
evolution: if traits evolve from fuzzy to sharp, if they gradually become stabilized, as discussed
in [93], then this simply means that pointing is still in the process of formation and has not yet
become perfectly innate.
Those who previously tried to explain the fixedness that is stereotypy tended to argue that
signals must be clear, that stereotypy makes them clearer, and that they are selected for this extra
clarity in a traditional process of selection, hence stereotypy [7, 110]. However, the early ethologists
began by studying an extreme—the fixed action pattern—and later, Barlow noted that even what
were previously called FAPs are not uniformly uniform, but rather some FAPs vary more than
others; they are not all completely “fixed” [7]. To explain this continuum of stereotypy, it has
been proposed that signals that need to be clearer are more stereotyped, and others are less so [7].
However, I argue that the clarity-based approach lacked parsimony from the beginning, because
stereotypy is a property of instinct in general, not just of signaling behavior specifically; and that
even if clarity plays some role in the evolution of stereotypy, uniformity varies first and foremost
because of the temporal nature of the process. That is, the degree of stereotypy is in general
associated with the point that the trait has reached along the spectrum of formation, and we
observe that it varies across traits because we are witnessing traits at different stages of formation.
In other words, even if we can imagine reasons why uniformity per se would also be of value, the
traditional focus on uniformity as a separate end obscures the general point of interest: stabilization
is an inherent part of interaction-based evolution15.
15This is not to say that all traits must inevitably cover the whole spectrum and reach the extreme, nor that
they all move along the spectrum at the same rate; but it is to say that the degree of fixedness comes from the
nature of the process of network-based evolution, and is not an independent element traditionally selected for, as
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Hinde’s comparative study of displays in finches demonstrates several of the points above [64].
First, the same trait may vary more or be more stereotyped in one species than another. Second,
demonstrating the evolution of FAPs from interactions, most displays in the finches studied by
Hinde are not yet fixed action patterns but rather are poses whose elements tend to occur together
statistically. Third, of the different displays, the one which is particularly rigid, stereotyped and
emancipated (the female soliciting posture), is also the one that is far more widely shared, and
therefore more ancient, than the other, still variable displays, in accord with the prediction that
stereotypy is indicative of the evolutionary stage of formation of a trait. Another, in-depth example
showing the evolution of different degrees of fixedness, and that stereotypy is a concomitant of the
evolution of adaptation, namely the evolution of decoy-nest construction in sand wasps, will be
given in section 4.12.1.
4.11 Interaction-based evolution provides a single explanation for the different
aspects of innateness
“Innate behavior” or “instinct” has been used to mean different things in the literature [121]:
1. Independence: It has been used to refer to behavior that is independent of interactions with
the external environment like learning or experience. Such independence is especially clear
when a behavior is present from birth, as for example in the pecking of domestic chicks [87]16.
2. Stereotypy: Innate behavior has been referred to as stereotyped (also, “fixed,” “constant,”
“rigid,” [121]—“robotic” ).
3. Sharedness: Innate behaviors have been found to be homologizable between species and
therefore useful for taxonomy. In other words, they are shared between species, with some
Maynard-Smith and Harper [108] and Mayr [110] have argued. Indeed, whether the evolving trait is a signal or
not, the evolutionary process is converging on an adaptation: along with the decrease in variance and disorder, it
converges on highly efficient structure and behavior. Clarity, which is part of the effectiveness of the signal, and
efficiency in other adaptations, are outcomes of the evolutionary process, and uniformity is an inherent concomitant
of the process in both cases.
16 “Environment” and “experience” need to be qualified: No behavior is entirely independent from the “environ-
ment” or from “experience” when these notions are so broadly construed as to include such factors as the flow of
food materials during development or the “source of experience” that one body tissue provides a neighboring one
in the course of development. Even what we more normally call “experience,” that is interaction with the outside
during growth and learning, can figure into and change aspects of behaviors that are otherwise innate. For example,
the tendency of the rat to build a nest is innate, yet it will not be able to carry it out if it is deprived of experi-
encing the carrying and manipulating of objects during development [87]. Despite this important qualification, the
conceptualization of innateness as independence from the environment is still true and useful in an important sense.
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species-specific characteristics [102, 63, 164, 165].
The fact that these three aspects are empirically connected is clear. First, both Tinbergen
and Lorenz considered it of great importance that stereotyped behavior (fixed action pattern;
point 2 above) is also homologizable between species and therefore is as useful for taxonomy as
morphological characters are (point 3) [136, 102]17 (Lorenz called it “an epoch making discovery”
[102, p.103]). Second, there is an agreement that, empirically, what is innate in the first sense
above (1)—what is automatic—appears also to be stereotyped, or “fixed;” it appears “robotic”
(2)18 [7, 121].
But why are the different aspects of innateness connected? Tinbergen’s tone regarding the first
connection outlined above (between points 2 and 3) was that of surprise [136, p.191]. And Barlow
discussed stereotypy in the context of the clarity of signals [7], which neither addressed stereotypy
in non-signaling behavior nor explained the connection between stereotypy and independence (even
though his continuum of FAPs ran both from variable to stereotyped and from dependent on to
independent of the environment at the same time [7]). Finally, Papaj’s model was unable to connect
stereotypy and independence [121].
However, from the point of view of interaction-based evolution, the different aspects of innate-
ness are connected. First, traits evolve by a process of convergence as defined (see section 4.10 and
[93])—a process of stabilization which begins at a state of high variance and eventually leads to
the evolution of uniformity and therefore stereotypy [93]. Since this process takes time, it makes it
so that stereotyped elements are older and more widely shared than elements not yet stereotyped,
while implying that stereotypy evolves in parallel. This point connects the sharing of a trait among
species with stereotypy (aspects 3 and 2 above, respectively).
Second, I have argued that interaction-based evolution works in the long-term through sim-
plification under performance pressure. This can not only make one intra-organismal module
independent of another, but also make it independent of environmental factors (see section 4.2).
Therefore, besides leading to stereotypy, the process of interaction-based evolution also leads to in-
17One must note, however, that parallel evolution of stereotyped traits in related species could also lead to “homol-
ogizable” traits in this sense even though in this case there is no common origin, strictly speaking, a scenario which
is in fact expected from interaction-based evolution.
18Even though there is variation in the degree of stereotypy, there is also variation in the degree of independence
from the environment, and biologists agree that what is strongly fixed tends to be strongly uninfluenced by the
environment, or “innate” in the first sense [121].
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creased independence from environmental factors (1). This ties together independence, phylogenetic
sharedness and stereotypy.
Two additional aspects of innateness also make sense in light of interaction-based evolution.
One is that welded elements often and perhaps always [98] are present in the fixed action pattern
(see sections 4.6 and 4.7), which aligns with the fact that welding is an outcome of network-
level evolution. It also sheds light on the issue of circuitous vs. accelerated development, as will be
discussed below (see section 4.13), which will clarify the connection between evolution and learning.
Traditional evolutionary theory has had difficulty explaining and reconciling the various aspects
of innateness. This has resulted in a call by Bateson to give up the use of the term “innate” alto-
gether and specify instead what particular meaning of innateness one is referring to [10]. In contrast,
by connecting the different aspects of innateness with recourse to one parsimonious mechanism,
interaction-based evolution fits with the fact that the term “innate” has been used intuitively as a
unifying concept for a long time. Furthermore, it shows how these different aspects are related to
each other.
4.12 Evolution from fuzzy to sharp: examples of the evolution of complex phe-
notypes
Because of their ostensible simplicity, examples like the evolution of malaria resistance due to the
HbS mutation have served the traditional notion of natural selection and random mutation. In
fact, fascinating molecular-level details are available that question the accidental nature of this
mutation and others [93]. However, putting aside this mounting evidence, another fundamental
issue is that examples of the evolution of complex phenotypes have been very much underplayed
in the evolutionary theory literature. In this paper, we have seen that these examples fit with the
view of interaction-based evolution: they demonstrate cooption and emancipation, stabilization
and stereotypy, and evolution from fuzzy to sharp. Most intriguingly, they speak to the arising of
novelty in a way that is consistent with network-level evolution.
For the reader who is interested in the detail, I will first discuss the example of decoy construction
in sand wasps. Other readers may skip to the final and most important phenotypic-level example—
that of egg retrieval by backward walking in the nightjar (section 4.12.2)—where I will demonstrate
all the elements discussed in this paper in one, with an emphasis on the central point of novelty.
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4.12.1 Elements of network evolution in the construction of decoys in sand wasps
This example is taken from Evans’s classic work on the comparative ethology of the sand wasps,
Bembicinae (previously called Nyssoninae; [40]). To make a nest, the sand wasps dig a tunnel
of many body lengths, at the end of which they build a cell or a complex of cells, where they
place their offspring and the prey on which the offspring feed. They have natural enemies—two
taxonomic groups of flies (the bee flies, Bombyliidae, and miltogrammine flies, Sarcophagidae)
and two taxonomic groups of parasitic wasps (the cuckoo wasps, Chrysididae, and “velvet ants,
Mutillidae)— that parasitize their nests by laying there, and whose larvae either takes up valuable
resources or destroy the larvae of the sand wasp. Parasites of the former two groups seek the nests
of their hosts by sight, and of the latter two groups by touch and odor—they fly over the ground,
tapping the soil with their antennae in search of their target. Across the sand wasps we find various
techniques of hiding and concealment as well as a decoy construction technique.
The example concerns the decoy construction [40, 39]): Some species of sand wasp dig a false
burrow (or multiple such burrows) next to the real one and leave it (or them) open, while leaving
the real nest burrow closed. Various parasites have been observed to either lay their eggs or linger
in the decoys. Evans hypothesized that false burrows originated in a behavior that had a different
purpose—that its origin is in cooption—and that the process of the evolution of digging false
burrows was a process of improvement through stereotypy, together with emancipation (see also
[142]).
He based his hypothesis on the following facts. Very commonly across the Bembicinae, the
wasps close the entrance to their nest from the outside before leaving it, either temporarily with a
small amount of soil before leaving temporarily for provisioning, or with a large amount of soil at the
final closure before leaving for good; and both within and outside of the Bembicinae, species have
been observed where individuals obtain soil for nest closure mostly from several or one particular
spot/s around the entrance. In this case they leave behind a small pit or pits of a size that depends
on how much a particular spot was used. The tendency to take soil from a particular spot or
spots appears to relate to environmental conditions, where individuals quarry soil for closure when
loose soil is not as easily available [39], though it also has a genetic component [39]. The more
soil was quarried from a particular spot, the bigger the pit left behind. In Bembecinus neglectus,
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for example, most individuals took the soil for closure from several particular spots around the
entrance, so that a ring of small depressions was left behind. But some took it mostly from one
particular spot, which formed a “depression or short false burrow up to 1 cm deep” [40, p.137].
Now, in the genus Bembix, which typifies the advanced behaviors of sand wasps, we see species
with decided false burrows. Three species are particularly telling: Bembix amoena, B. texana
and B. sayi. In B. amoena, false burrows are of irregular occurrence and spatial pattern and are
relatively short, and the burrowing is still almost always associated with quarrying soil for closure.
Most individuals obtain soil for the initial closure by scraping a small amount of soil from each
side of the nest entrance, and occasionally from a particular spot or spots, creating short false
burrows that stretch in a direction of 90 degrees or a bit less left or right of the direction of the
true nest, obliquely into the ground. These short false side burrows varied in length from barely
perceptible to 2 cm long, with two exceptional cases observed at 3 cm and 5 cm long [40]. Evans
[40] noted that, in one population, about half of the nests had no such false side burrows, about a
quarter had one, and the rest had two such false side burrows at one time or another. In addition,
individuals also collected soil from opposite of the nest entrance, most often, but not always, for
the final closure (which requires more soil), which resulted either in a furrow going through the
mound of soil opposite the true nest (a mound resulting from the excavation of the true nest),
or in a burrow running under that mound obliquely through the ground. The former appeared a
considerable number of times, [40, p.280] and were of varying length, between 1 and 7 cm long.
The latter appeared rarely [40], with only three cases noted, at 1.5, 2 and 3 cm long. Evans [40,
p.281] noted that two of these were made following final closure in a manner similar to that of
Bembix sayi (see below), which seems to suggest that these two rare instances occurred not in the
service of obtaining soil for closure.
Besides the burrows themselves, the manner and timing of construction of the burrows was
also variable of course (Evans 1966a,b). The burrows on the sides, when they occurred, occurred
sometimes along with the initial closure and sometimes along with later closures. The back burrows
and furrows, when they appeared, appeared often along with the final closure but sometimes along
with earlier closures, and the final closure did not always involve them. While burrows were
sometimes revisited and expanded, they were sometimes accidentally filled while making a closure.
Likewise, the spatial pattern resulting at the end was variable, with 0 or 1 or 2 side burrows and 0
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or 1 back burrow or furrow [40, 39]. Note that, although the soil was generally taken for closures,
parasites were distracted by the false burrows that resulted [39].
In B. texana, construction of false burrows is more or less regular, and the soil is not used for
closure. Typically, individuals construct one short but relatively persistent false burrow on each
side of the entrance, right after the initial closure is made [40]. The method of construction is not
yet entirely stereotyped, with some individuals digging one burrow and then the other, and others
alternating in digging both [40, p.325].
In B. sayi, construction is invariable and emancipated: all females dig one strong back burrow
4–22 cm long under the mound after completion of final closure (which also means that the soil is
not used for closure) [40, 39].
The three species above exemplify certain general trends [40, 39]. The primitive cases of false
burrows, where the burrow is but a small pit, are unreliable and irregular in appearance. The
“transitional” case of B. amoena shows burrows appearing in a notable number of cases but still
rather irregularly. They are often longer than “small pits” but are still relatively short and vary
greatly in length. In the advanced cases, the burrows appear with greater regularity and are
substantial. In B. sayi, which makes the longest burrows, the burrows appear invariably in all
individuals and at a regular time. There is an association between stereotypy and completeness of
the burrow [40, 39].
In addition, there is an association between stereotypy and emancipation of burrow-making from
its previous cause [40, 39]. That is, limited quarrying in the service of obtaining soil for closure is
a widespread phenomenon, and tends to be irregular in occurrence; whereas, in contrast, regular
burrows are the result of burrowing for its own sake, an operation not used for closure, and are
constructed at regular times before or after closure, depending on the particular species concerned.
In some of the advanced species where burrow-making is thus emancipated, the wasps refresh or
fix burrows that have been destroyed [142], which further clarifies that they are programmed to
maintain a certain pattern of false burrows. The above characteristics are also associated with
increased regularity of the spatial pattern of the burrows, with each of the different emancipated
species having its own idiosyncratic characteristics of construction [40, 39].
Furthermore, not only have emancipated burrows never been observed in species that lack
closures, but in addition, a careful reading of Evans [40] shows that, even though they are no
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longer used for closure, emancipated back burrows are temporally associated with final closures,
and emancipated side burrows are temporally associated with initial closures, which seems to cross-
validate the fact that the origin of emancipated burrows is in closure-making.
Thus, evidence clearly supports the predictions of interaction-based evolution. The evolution
of false burrows originated in cooption—in emerging high-level interactions between preevolved ele-
ments like digging, quarrying and making closures, and environmental elements like sand conditions.
That was a state of high variance in behavior and outcome within and between individuals. Evolu-
tion then proceeded from fuzzy to sharp: through a process of convergence and gradual stabilization
of the trait as a whole toward a stable, emancipated and clock-work–like state. The process was
that of improvement together with and at the same time as stereotypy and emancipation. Note
that it is not the case that complete but irregular burrows evolved first, and then were stabilized.
That is, stereotypy, or uniformity, is not an outcome of a force of stabilizing selection separate from
the selection for the adaptation itself. Rather, stabilization and improvement evolve together as
two aspects of the same coin—as inherent concomitants of the adaptive evolution of the whole as a
whole, as predicted by interaction-based evolution.
4.12.2 The emergence of novelty in the evolution of egg retrieval by backward walking
I will now discuss the final and most important phenotypic-level example that puts all of the
elements of the theory discussed here together, while emphasizing the central point of the emergence
of novelty. This is the example of the evolution of egg retrieval by backward walking in the nightjar
(Caprimulgus europaeus) and other species, which applies to eggs that have rolled far outside the
nest. Before we can understand it, I must first explain what the shifting motion in birds is.
The shifting motion in birds is ancient and involves rolling an egg with the beak until it reaches
under the body. The egg may have thus gotten in between other eggs and stirred them, and the
egg sides that are pointing up are thus changed [138]. Shifting may be needed to ensure even
temperature distribution to the eggs [17], and is performed upon arrival at the nest, or when the
tactile stimulus provided by the eggs while brooding is not satisfying, or spontaneously after a long
spell of quiet brooding [138]. In terns, the shifting motion will move an egg about 2–3 inches.
Coming back to our case of egg retrieval, in terns (e.g., Onychoprion fuscatus), the general
situation is as follows [158, 138]: If they notice an egg lying several inches outside of the nest, they
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leave the nest right away to it. However, they have an aversion toward being far from the nest,
induced by their brooding state, and as they move away from the nest, they slow down, sometimes
turning around and returning to the nest without having reached the external egg. But sometimes
they do get to the egg, stopping short of it just close enough that they can reach it with the beak
and apply the shifting motion to it, which rolls the egg until it is under the breast.
As they shift the egg, they sit down on it to incubate it, but only for a short time (indeed they
may at this point be dissatisfied with the tactile stimulus and/or with being outside of the nest).
The moment they notice the nest again they stand up and walk to it. In the process, the egg has
moved about 2-3 inches toward the nest due to the shifting motion.
Having returned to the nest and started brooding the eggs there, they soon notice the external
egg again, venture out toward it again, and repeat the process, and the egg moves 2-3 inches again
toward the nest. Thus, after several trips, the egg finds its way back to the nest.
The behavior that results in the egg being moved back to the nest is clearly unstructured. The
brooding of the external egg outside of the nest and the back-and-forth trips show the lack of insight
or “analysis of the situation as a whole” [158, p.83], as the different actions taken in the situation
are under the proximate control of different preevolved instincts. In accordance with Tinbergen
[138], these instincts are competing with each other for expression: the desire not to leave the nest,
the desire to return to the nest, the desire to brood eggs, and the desire and ability to shift an egg.
Also, as Marshall noted for the common tern (Sterna hirundo) [107], there is much variance in the
behavior and its outcome, with eggs sometimes being rolled back into the nest and sometimes not,
and this variance is thought to reflect both individual variance and situational factors [107].
In other birds, however, such as greylag geese (Anser anser), black-headed gulls (Chroico-
cephalus ridibundus) and nightjars, the bird walks straight up to the egg, puts the beak over it as
it would in shifting, but instead of incubating the egg there, it then walks backwards all the way
to the nest in one shot while shifting and dragging the egg under its beak [75, 138].
According to Tinbergen, this egg rolling observed in nightjars and other birds evolved from
shifting and other elements of the situation [138]. Indeed, the fact that the birds are using a
shifting motion while walking backward (even though rolling with the wing would have been much
more efficient) together with the fact that shifting is ancient, supports this hypothesis [138]. In fact,
Tinbergen notes that the very controversy about whether egg retrieval is an independent adaptation
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or a by-product of a confluence of instincts in different species shows its route of evolution [138].
The argument that this backward walking behavior appearing in nightjars and other birds
evolved from a situation akin to that of the terns exemplifies several elements in one: The trait
has evolved from fuzzy to sharp; from unstructured and inefficient to structured and efficient; from
variable and unstable to stable, stereotyped and “rigorous.” In addition, we also see emancipation
in it: the return back to the nest originally required the visual stimulus of seeing the nest, but now
is triggered automatically as soon as the shifting motion begins and requires no turning-around to
the nest. We also see welding: the going-to-the-egg and the coming-back-to-the-nest legs have been
welded together in one sequence unleashed by the stimulus of seeing the external egg for the first
time, whereas previously they were two separate legs each triggered by its own visual stimulus. The
whole situation has been simplified, the path has been straightened up. In fact, the simplification
has been the creation of a method from a previously non-methodical occurrence, when all the while
the whole evolved as a whole, not by the addition of independent elements one at a time.
On top of all of the above, one topic deserves a special emphasis: novelty. The example of egg
rolling shows clearly that different instincts or elements have the inherent ability to come together
into new, useful interactions that together can achieve what had been unachievable before by any
one of those instincts alone. Twice we see that this coming together of pre-evolved elements into
useful, high-level interactions, which is outside of the purview of the random mutation and natural
selection view, breaks a barrier in terms of being able to do something that could not have been
done before. First, the confluence of instincts for shifting, brooding and returning to the nest
effectively allows the egg to be returned to the nest after several trips, even if in a haphazard way,
when none of these instincts by itself is capable of achieving this, nor did any of them originate due
to pressure for such egg retrieval. The second barrier broken was this: the invention of backward
walking while shifting allows retrieval of the egg in time that is proportional simply to the distance
to the egg, whereas the haphazard way only allows retrieval in time that is quadratic in distance.
This improvement allows nightjars to retrieve eggs from many yards away, which would not have
been effectively possible in the case of terns (indeed terns retrieve eggs from only several inches
away). Thus, emancipation and welding have created a behavior that now applies to a broader
range of situations than the ancestral traits applied to. Some of these birds now dwell in beaches
where eggs can indeed be blown away by wind a great distance.
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These breakings of barriers in the formation of new traits exemplify novelty. The novelty is
in the inherent ability of elements to come together into new and useful high-level interactions.
These elements come together first in a haphazard state. Their complex interaction then serves as
a substrate for simplification under performance pressure, where new such elements will be formed.
I propose that this cycle is the heart of the evolutionary process. I have furthermore proposed that
it is simplification under performance pressure that is responsible for this inherent usefulness of
elements—for their propensity to come together into new, useful interactions that they have not
been directly selected for.
This point provides an understanding of novelty in evolution that is completely different from
and not reducible to traditional random mutation and natural selection. The novelty that drives
evolution here arises from the coming together of high-level “modules,” i.e., from the network as a
whole. It is not a local, “misspelling”-like change at the genetic level. It is not accidental, or random
mutation that invents in evolution. Rather, non-accidental mutation and natural selection together
process information gradually, and the source of novelty in evolution is the resulting inherent ability
of elements to come together in useful high-level interactions, an ability due to simplification under
performance pressure.
Watson and Lashley [158] saw that the outcome of the haphazard mode of egg retrieval was not
intentional. They noted that the egg rolls in the direction of the nest simply because the bird is
oriented directly away from the nest as it reaches the egg, so that the shifting motion happens to
bring the egg a bit closer to the nest each time. From this they concluded that the egg finds its way
to the nest by lucky happenstance. But this lucky happenstance is a far cry from the traditional
notion of novelty in random mutation. First, it is not a local accidental mutation that invents,
but rather the process starts with high-level interactions, and gradual network evolution creates
something new from this source. Second, an extraordinarily deep new question arises. Should we
call this source of novelty “randomness” or “lucky happenstance” at the phenotypic level, and say
no more? There is logic to the present situation that goes beyond the purely coincidental. That is,
although the egg rolls to the nest only because of the bird’s orientation, could the bird have been
oriented any other way? Indeed, it is oriented in the way that it is because it is walking straight
up to the egg from the nest. Thus, the efficiency of this movement is integrated with the feasibility
of the retrieval system. Indeed, the whole situation, while haphazard, is not purely random, but
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can be seen as a fuzzy sort of “shifting in an extended nest.” Thus, a confluence of instincts, each
useful in and of itself, together give rise to something useful that is different from each of them, but
which at first can only appear in a roundabout, highly variable, even though not purely random,
fashion. As such, it serves as material for evolutionary simplification and streamlining, which ends
up creating something that can be useful in contexts that go beyond the one that originated it.
It is intriguing that an unqualified notion of the accidental does not sufficiently explain novelty
here. When we apply this way of thinking to other cases of cooption, we will see that, individu-
ally, they may appear more or less accidental than the above case; but they are not, in general,
“pure coincidences.” This, together with the question of how exactly simplification under perfor-
mance pressure leads to inherently useful elements, opens up an intriguing new area for scientific
investigation—a science of novelty.
While others have discussed the possibility of cooption being a source of novelty [57], it has
been discussed within the random mutation view—cooption has been treated as a random event and
another source of novelty in addition to random mutation. In contrast, interaction-based evolution
argues that cooption is neither a random event nor another source of novelty in addition to random
mutation. Rather, non-accidental mutation and natural selection gradually pave the way to both
genetic and phenotypic cooption at the macroscale through network-level evolution. Thus, neither
mutation nor cooption are random in the traditional sense even though they produce surprising
things, and they are not separate sources of novelty but come together as two inseparable aspects
of one process. Cooption is at the heart of the process of interaction-based evolution and is built
into this process.
Thus, while in the traditional view, novelty arises by accident at a specific point in space and
time, according to interaction-based evolution, novelty is an outcome that arises over time at the
network level from the coevolutionary change of many elements. While the drivers of these local
changes are not random, these changes still interact with each other globally in a surprising way.
Surprise, or novelty, exists, but it is not a mere direct effect of dice rolling.
It is noteworthy that the tern situation is based on conflict, or competition between tendencies.
The bird, on the one hand, acts as though it wants to reach up to the egg and incubate it, but
on the other hand as though it wants to remain in the nest. It is also noteworthy that there is
individual variation in the overall behavior, and indeed, there may be different ways of increasing
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the probability of success. One way may be to approach the egg without hesitation. Another
may be to get back to the nest without delay once the egg has been shifted. There is an inherent
conflict in the situation. Both tendencies have something to contribute, but they are conflicting.
To strengthen one at the expense of the other may be harmful. Evolution may need to take a
modest though complex step: to find a solution for returning to the nest immediately and only
after reaching the egg while engaging it with the beak. This can be achieved, for example, by
overcoming the tendency to incubate but only while standing outside of the nest. The relevant
rule to evolve, “incubate in the presence of eggs AND when standing in the nest” is simple but
non-linear. In performing this evolutionary step, the convergence process described in [93] may
lead to the crystallization of the commonality between successful individuals while resolving the
conflict inherent in the situation, making evolution a process of conflict resolution.
The example also shows us, of course, that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts and
that the organism evolves as a whole. Conceptualizing evolution in this way provides an answer to
the many inconsistencies that arise from the accidental mutation framework, such as the fact that
it often leads us to surmise difficult evolutionary sequences leading to complex adaptations where
the intervening steps are not adaptive in and of themselves.
Finally, the example also shows us a connection between punctualism and gradualism. Suppose
that, as the underlying instincts evolve and are being emancipated and adjusted, the balance of
tendencies gradually changes such that the tendency to incubate the external egg while outside
of the nest falls below the tendency to return to the nest, while the tendency to return remains
balanced with shifting, so that returning and shifting are expressed together. In that case, these
tendencies may evolve gradually, while the new trait may arise punctually: it may be possible for
a bird species to evolve backward-walking retrieval as a whole and rather rapidly, causing a “phase
transition” at the level of the observed behavior. Backward walking will then appear first in one
individual, then in another, then more and more—it will appear “like the rain.” Thus, punctualism
is better understood when we start thinking in terms of network evolution, as an outcome of gradual
trends in the change of a network that interact with each other.
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4.13 How evolution learns: circuitous vs. accelerated development
The example of the evolution of egg retrieval highlights a fifth aspect of innateness. The terns are
not learning to retrieve the egg in the same way that humans learn a task. They have a set of
inborn tendencies that, in the situation, result in egg retrieval. At the same time the haphazard
behavior which results in egg retrieval does not seem to fit the term “innate.” There is another
aspect to innateness, and that is the degree to which a behavior develops straightforwardly and
quickly in an endogenously driven fashion. Two opposing examples will demonstrate this point.
After an emerged butterfly finishes its preparations for flight (like drying its wings), it takes to
the air and flies in search of food and mates. While the behavior of taking off is instigated by
having just completed preparations (so it too is dependent on “experience” in some sense), it is
not driven by their completion, much like a car is not pushed forward by the gas pedal. It is
endogenous for all intents and purposes and is a true instinct. In contrast, the behavior which
results in egg retrieval in the terns arises circuitously and at a high level, from a meeting of
different inborn behavioral elements as well as environmental factors which play a more inherent
role in inducing the behavior: the visual stimuli and conflicting instincts do cause the retrieval
of the egg. This high level meeting of modules, both internal and external, now serves as the
source of evolution from fuzzy to sharp, at the end of which a new innate module, consisting of a
combination of the previously independent elements, will arise (that of backward walking). This
aspect, namely, how quickly, straightforwardly and endogenously a behavior (or a trait in general,
including morphological traits) arises in development is important for acceleration: In the initial
circuity there is a potential for “straightening up,” there is a potential for simplification that will
lead to the further breaking of barriers (e.g., substantially faster egg retrieval). The environmental
factors play a more inherent role in inducing the behavioral outcome in the tern situation than in
the butterfly situation (they are less like the gas pedal and more a part of the engine), which means
that, in becoming emancipated from them, the life form can “learn” from the environment through
evolutionary change. That is, it now produces more endogenously what the environment helped to
produce before. I argue that this emancipation is the intergenerational “learning” that is done by
evolution, drawing an analogy between evolution and learning (see more in section 5.6).
It is interesting that those who have tried to define innateness often seemed to mean that, in
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contrast with learned behavior, innate behavior is in a sense “predetermined” [121]. In other words,
in innate traits, the fit with the environment is predetermined, as opposed to learned behavior or
morphological plasticity, where the fit is “acquired.” However, notice that this predetermined fit
is adaptation. The evolution of innateness, or automatization, is the evolution of adaptation.
And, according to interaction-based evolution, the evolution of adaptation involves network-level
evolution and the acquisition of a new phenotypic meaning as a result of the changing context in
which modules are embedded. Interaction-based evolution shares with neo-Darwinism the reliance
on natural selection for evolution of adaptations; it shares with Lamarckism the appearance of the
inheritance of acquired characters (though it relies on a completely different mechanism); but it
shares with neither the new idea that evolution is network-based and interactions-based.
4.13.1 The engine of evolution
Interaction-based evolution argues that the process whereby a population converges [93] on an
adaptation is a process that converts information from a less orderly to a more orderly state. It
proceeds from a fuzzy to a sharp, well-working and stereotyped state. However, evolution is not
only a fuzzy-to-sharp process, in that the fuzzy source must first arise. The progress from fuzzy to
sharp is therefore only a half of a cycle of the “engine of creativity” that is evolution. The other
half is that previously made sharp elements come together at a high level to make the new fuzzy
source (e.g., the different instincts in the tern situation come together into a disorderly form of
egg-retrieval), from which new sharp elements can be made (e.g., backward walking)19. I argued
that simplification under performance pressure connects the two parts of the cycle. The simple
elements it creates not only are improvements but also come together in new complex interactions
which serve as the raw material for the next round of simplification. Thus, novelty arises not from
accident, but from evolutionary work.
5 A new view of the evolutionary process
In this section I will revisit the molecular level from the perspective of interaction-based evolution
in light of the concepts learned so far. I will clarify the nature of mutation and raise directions for
19Of course, these cycles do not occur in a sequence one at a time. At any time point in the course of the evolution
of a given life form we may expect many co-occurring cycles, each at a different phase.
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future research regarding it.
5.1 Connections between the microscale and the macroscale
While [93] developed the micro-scale view of network-based evolution, the current paper develops
the macroscale view of it. In both, there is a sense of chunking: On the macroscale, genes as well
as phenotypes can become welded in the long-term. On the microscale, information from multiple
loci comes together in each of many mutational events (including epigenetic changes) in each of
many individuals in each of many generations.
An important remark may now be made. One might think that, according to [93], non-accidental
mutation combines information from alleles at multiple loci into one locus in a way that recreates
in the mutated locus the combination of alleles as it was. However, this is not what is meant in [93].
According to interaction-based evolution, there is a flow of information from the combination of
alleles across loci into one locus, which generates a hereditary effect; but this effect does not replicate
the combination as is. The situation is analogous to that of a neuron (or a logical gate), whose
output does not replicate its inputs yet represents a lasting effect of this combination of inputs that
is transferred to the next layer in the network. In other words, interaction-based evolution argues
that many non-accidental mutational events over many generations and at many loci come together
into a network of information flow across the genome and through the generations, from many loci
into one and from one locus to many, and this information flow gradually leads to phenotypic
chunking at the macroscale, among else. That is, the information flow in Figure 2 is the moment-
to-moment workings of evolution; cooption and chunking at the macroscale (e.g., gene fusion or
phenotypic fusion) are among the long-term consequences of it.
This point may also help us understand better the gradual manner of occurrence of a gene fusion
or of a splicing pattern which, according to interaction-based evolution, are not sudden stochastic
events but the results of long-term processes. As discussed earlier, alleles at multiple loci affect the
regulation of an alternative splicing pattern, and the information they represent is processed and
stabilized in the long term through convergence as defined in [93], thus setting the new alternative
splicing patterns and new contiguous sequences that we see today. Many writing events, in many
individuals, over many generations, gradually pave the way for network evolution at the gene level
(see the example of the fusion of TRIM5 and CypA in section 2.1).
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5.2 The two ecologies working together: the ecology of energy and the ecology
of information
I will now attempt to put the various arguments of [93] and of this paper into one philosophical
picture. A machine has several aspects: First, it is a finite, unchanging structure that repeats
its operation over and over again, performing the same “trick.” Second, we tend to think of a
machine as something that operates harmoniously and whose parts have been conceived to fit each
other harmoniously. Third, novelty or “out of the box” thinking is the antithesis of machine-like
behavior.
Now, the traditional idea of natural selection and random mutation is machine-like in the first
sense: it is one trick that repeats itself indefinitely without changing its own fundamental nature.
That is, random mutation occurs either as an error during replication or for another accidental
reason, and natural selection either accepts it or rejects it. The repetition of this operation is
traditionally supposed to be responsible for all of life and every innovation in it—a belief that I
have argued against.
Here, I will draw the distinction that the writing of mutation postulated by interaction-based
evolution [93] is not machine-like in any of the above senses. First, the writing itself evolves and its
evolution is fundamental to its operation—its operation is not repetitive [93]. Second, the workings
of evolution are not devoid of internal conflict but rather based on it, as will be discussed shortly.
Third, the production of novelty is at the essence of evolution (Notice, however, that while evolution
is not machine-like, its products are machine-like: evolution is a process of automatization).
What is the nature of the writing of mutations then? As discussed in [93], the mutation writing
phenotype has the same meta-structure as that of the performing phenotype in the following sense.
Take locomotion for example: we share with bears the fact that we have four limbs; but unlike bears
we are habitual bipeds; and each of us may have a specific leg length and muscular details slightly
different from those of others. In other words, a trait consists of widely shared and generally de-
fined characteristics along with more specific and more narrowly shared characteristics, up to and
including individual differences. According to interaction-based evolution, the mutation writing
phenotype is the same in this regard [93]. It consists of generally defined and widely shared char-
acteristics (for example, the long-term trend of the movement of genes out of the X chromosome in
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Drosophila [145]), along with more specific and narrowly shared characteristics up to and including
individual differences in mutational tendencies [93]. This meta-structure explains the observations
on genetic relatedness in mutational tendencies discussed in [93]. Furthermore, it implies that the
nature of mutational mechanisms can be conceptualized by analogy to ecological interactions: The
writing of mutations happens not according to a fixed “rule” but by the ever evolving “rules of the
jungle.” This “jungle” is a complex one consisting of DNA and other biomolecules. The actors
in it—the genetic influences on mutation—meet in an individual due to sexual reproduction, and
genetic changes happen in accordance with the usual tendencies of the actors as well as in accor-
dance with their individual characteristics and the particular combination they appear in in the
given situation. All the while, the actors themselves slowly evolve in the long-term. Thus, when we
talk about the workings of mutation, we are not talking about a harmonious, repetitive operation
of a single mechanism. Instead, we are talking about the workings of an “ecology,” except that the
outcome is not remembered in terms of energy transfers such as food-web interactions but in terms
of symbolic changes in genomes. It is an ecology of information.
According to this picture, the biological world has two facets to it, two “forces”: one that is
due to biological interactions that make their mark through differential survival and reproduction;
and one that is due to biological interactions that make their mark through the writing of genetic
changes [93]. These latter biological interactions are not limited to molecular mechanisms operating
inside the germ cells, but involve also everything else that affects the writing of mutations, such as
mechanisms of mate choice and of the sexual shuffling of the genes [93].
These two forces come together in the individual: the selection of individuals determines which
alleles will be passed on, and the writing of alleles determines which alleles will be there in the first
place. Thus, selection and writing are equally influential opponents, and they both participate in
changing the genetic and phenotypic nature of the organism and thus of themselves. While each
of these forces has some long-term (phylogenetically shared) tendencies, each is oblivious to the
present, immediate workings of the other: the intra-organismal writing of mutations that takes
place at the present moment is shielded from the external workings of natural selection that takes
place at the present moment, and likewise the latter is unaffected by the former, even though
the consequences of each will eventually affect the nature of the other. In that sense, evolution
arises from a conflict, or a process of negotiation, between these two fundamental forces, and what
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happens in the long-term must be more or less congruent with both.
5.3 A balance of continually evolving mutational forces is responsible for genetic
change
I argued above that the writing of mutations is analogous to an ecology. An ecology is a system
of conflicting forces, where each species presses to produce more of itself while at the same time
undoing the growth of others. And indeed, when we look at molecular evolutionary changes, we
often see long-term processes that are the result of a balance of forces in the short-term.
As an example, consider tandem gene duplication. Due to the nature of the mutational mech-
anisms of tandem duplication and deletion, a gene that is duplicated at tandem experiences an
increased chance not only of being further duplicated but also of losing a copy [59]. At the same
time, mutations that arise in the copies in the course of evolution push toward evolutionary di-
vergence of the copies and thus toward the cessation of duplication/deletion (because homology is
required for tandem duplication/deletion), while gene conversion events push to make the copies
the same again, a situation where copies are more likely to disappear. Evolution here is a reversible
process where the long-term outcome depends on a balance of forces. Note also that, in this case,
gene conversion may be seen as simplification, and diversification as complexification, and that the
opposing tendencies to duplicate and specialize on the one hand and to equalize and collapse on
the other may be part of maintaining a balance between over-specialization (or “over-fitting”) and
over-simplification, showing the importance of the “ecology of information” for evolution.
As another example, consider the evolution of CpG content, which plays a role in gene regulation
and therefore development [134, 31]. The cytosine in CpG dinucleotides mutates into thymine at a
high rate after it is methylated [65], causing CpG-poor islands to lose their CpGs [112]. Importantly,
this cytosine is methylated by complex enzymatic processes [77], which means that the locations
of these mutations are determined biologically, not by accident [93]. At the same time, another
mutational force—that of biased gene conversion (BGC)—adds cytosine to some CpG-poor islands
[52, 36], and it has been shown that the balance of such forces determines the direction of the
evolution of CpG content [112]. We have here a balance of mutational forces that in the long term
affects functional, adaptive structure [134, 31], which fits with interaction-based evolution [93] but
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is hard to explain from the traditional view of evolution20. Indeed, CpG mutations are not a rare
anomaly, but have been estimated to account for nearly 25% of all point mutations in humans21
[51].
As yet another example, based on an analysis of short open reading frames in yeast, Carvunins
et al. have suggested that the evolution of new genes is gradual and reversible [19]: that a new
gene does not arise suddenly as a complete whole, but gradually through forms more and more
resembling a complete gene; and that at each point in time, the gene can make a step toward or
away from completion. I argue that this process too is driven by a balance of forces. In mammals,
for example, it would involve the evolution of CpG content.
Finally, consider the proliferation vs. silencing and removal of transposable elements (TEs).
There has been a well-known divide between those who think that TEs are serviceable to the
organism (e.g., [106, 43, 111, 14, 130]) and those who see them as “selfish-elements” [29, 117, 35]22:
on the one hand it is now clear that TEs play an immense role in adaptive evolution [11, 127, 42, 106],
and on the other hand the evolutionary “benefit” they bring resides in a timescale too long to allow
them to fit comfortably in the traditional conceptualization of evolution except as selfish elements.
However, the writing of mutations is an ecology; it is not a machine-like. TEs may well act as
though they are propelled to replicate and insert themselves wherever they can, and yet, in the
context of the rules of the evolving information ecology, they may be serving the evolution of the
organism in the long-term23. Indeed, giving contra-pressure to TE proliferation is an extensive and
phylogenetically deep system of regulation, involving methylation and TE removal, active in the
germline [135]. I argue that this extensive system is part of the ecology of mutation writing and,
like Fedoroff [43], I argue that it does not merely act as an “immune defense.”
The four examples above clarify the view of genetic change as an ecology of information. It is
a view of conflicting forces pushing against each other, including long-term reactions that may be
locally reversible. This process computes in the long-term and involves the evolution of the network
20Indeed, as Duret and Galtier argued, CpGs work en masse, and the impact of any one particular CpG mutation
is insignificant and could not be explained by traditional natural selection [36].
21This is the case even though CpG dinucleotides account for only about 1% of the human genome. Further-
more, they are often accompanied by mutations in nearby bases [123, 157], further compounding the involvement of
mutational mechanisms in their origination.
22along with some attempts to reconcile the opposing views [33, 34, 93].
23This is the case even if they have the appearance of “selfish players” that has been attributed to them, and even
if they occasionally cause accidents in the short-term in the form of genetic disease [93].
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as a whole: the network gradually changes as it finds where it can give way under this complex set
of forces. Thus, through mutational writing, the network processes a large amount of information
under natural selection.
5.4 Evolutionary mutational mechanisms—a field open for future study
Interaction-based evolution opens up the search for non-Lamarckian yet useful mutational mecha-
nisms. Earlier I proposed a gene-fusion mechanism that may play a role in evolution reminiscent of
the role that Hebbian learning plays in neural networks (section 2.1; see also section 5.6), according
to which copies of genes that are used together are more likely to be fused together. This type
of mechanism would not cause accidental changes but rather would produce evolutionarily useful
genetic variation, without violating the principle that mutation does not respond to the immediate
environment24.
Another example of a type of mechanism that would make sense in light of the current theory is
as follows. Since information about the pattern and extent of expression of a gene is present in the
DNA and accessible in the germ cells in principle, a gene that is highly expressed and is therefore
extensively used may be more likely to be duplicated by transcription-coupled mutational mecha-
nisms. As in the case of the gene-fusion mechanism mentioned above, transcriptional promiscuity
in the germ cells may be involved in such mechanisms (see section 2.1). When operating in uni-
cellular organisms, such mechanisms could explain, among else, cases of rapid adaptive evolution
in response to environmental pressures such as extreme temperatures, extreme salinity, or toxins,
where a gene whose product is in demand is duplicated/amplified (see [78] for review) and thus,
at first glance, may seem to imply Lamarckism. However, mechanisms of this sort, coupling gene
expression level to gene duplication, may serve evolution in general in a non-Lamarckian fashion.
Namely, increasing the probability of germline duplication of a gene that is extensively used in the
soma may be useful because such a gene may have a greater potential to beneficially specialize
evolutionarily into different functions. Thus, while in unicellulars, environmental pressures may
24Interestingly, while the mutational fusion mechanism hypothesized earlier is based on putting together empirical
observations (namely the nature of transcription, chromatin states, reverse transcription and gene fusion), its gen-
eral nature was predicted based on theoretical considerations of interaction-based evolution [93]: in the latter, the
conceptual connection between the problem of sexual recombination and mutational mechanisms required that genes
play a dual role: one of performance under natural selection, and another of influencing mutation in the germline
[93]. Thus, the coupling of germline mutation and somatic performance through transcription as in the mechanism
hypothesized earlier allows for a convergence of ideas and empirically based considerations.
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directly cause the overexpression of a gene and thus its propensity to be duplicated through muta-
tional mechanisms, in general it is evolution itself that would lead to the situation where a gene is
highly expressed and to the application of these mutational mechanisms in a non-Lamarckian, yet
useful, fashion. The fusion of CypA and Trim5 serves as an example here as well, since this fusion
involved duplication of CypA through retrotranscription, and extensive transcription of CypA in
the germline may have facilitated this evolutionary event [71].
Also of interest in this regard are cases such as the evolution of insecticide resistance in the
mosquito Culex pipiens due to the amplification of the genes coding for two non-specific esterases
as well as for the acetylcholinesterase that is the main target of the applied insecticides, which is
active in the central nervous system [89, 85]. These duplications may have originated not by accident
but by a gradual albeit rapid process of evolution involving natural selection and non-accidental
mutation, which has created the genetic conditions under which the duplication mechanisms are
more likely to be activated25.
The current theory draws our attention to the fact that mechanisms such as the above can exist
and puts them front and center. The examples above demonstrate that the evolving organism can
receive feedback on what genetic changes would be useful to attempt—for example, what genes
may be beneficially chunked together. Furthermore, this feedback comes not from the immediate
environment, but from the population’s past successes—the information is in the genome; there is
no Lamarckism here. By accepting that mutation is not random, we can see that many findings
regarding genetic activity that have been thought of before as separate phenomena may actually
be working together toward a larger goal—allowing evolution to be a smart process, but one that
relies on defensible principles. This view opens the door to examining future research questions
that would not have come to light otherwise.
Indeed, we may expect a diversity of mutation-writing mechanisms in nature, and the above are
merely two examples of these. While some of these mechanisms may be well known phenomena that
have not yet been placed within a theoretical framework—for example the fact that recombinational
mechanisms interact with DNA sequences in such manner that enables whole gene duplication and
deletion—many others may remain to be discovered.
25Such a process would enable selection on multiple or many loci to be funneled by mutational mechanisms to
influence the probability of duplication of a particular gene or genes.
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5.5 The intimate relationship between useful change and error repair
It is so often said that mutation is a replication error that one might think that this is a well-known
scientific fact. However, the only fact that has actually been established is the basic observation
itself—that while some genes are duplicated, others undergo genetic change. To say that these
changes represent nothing more than “replication errors” is to provide merely one interpretation
to this fact, and it may be a prejudiced one. This interpretation has led among else to the terms
“error-repair mechanisms” and “error-prone” repair mechanisms, which, according to the theory
presented here, may end up detracting from our understanding of evolution.
Error is often a deviation from a pattern. By noticing a deviation from a pattern we can find
and fix a typographical error: a word with a typo slightly differs from many instances of the word
seen before, which are all identical to each other; and it can be fixed by making it identical to
those many other instances. Then again, by noticing a deviation from a pattern, we can also avoid
picking a rotten apple in the store, even if we have never seen rot or an apple before. Taking one
step further, by noticing a deviation from a pattern we can also spot an error of thought. Take for
example Scala Naturae, according to which all organisms fall into a linear order from the simplest
to the most advanced. From that perspective, the fact that many organisms are hard to classify
as more or less advanced in relation to each other is a deviation from a pattern. By replacing
Scala Naturae with Darwin’s concept of common descent, this difficulty of classification becomes
not a deviation from a pattern but a part of a larger pattern involving other facts. Thus, both
errors of typing and errors of thought can be corrected by pattern completion at different levels.
At the same time, pattern completion is a form of simplification—the fewer exceptions we need to
have, the smaller the amount of information needed to describe the entire system and its parts, as
information theory makes clear [91]. Thus, if pattern-completion operations can be implemented by
mutation, we may see the same genetic mechanisms operating both in “typographical corrections”
and in the kind of mutational writing that leads to progressive evolution. As an example, repeated
events of gene conversion have the potential to correct “typos,” but they also have the potential
to implement simplification pressure opposing the complexification pressure of diversifying in the
case of duplication and deletion discussed in section 5.3.
The insufficiency of our current jargon is made particularly clear by the phrase “error-prone
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repair.” Suppose that, in some cases where so-called “error-prone repair” is activated, the biological
system is actually pushing for a change rather than a restoration of the genetic state, and that
this change is a part of a pattern-completion or other progressive evolution of the network as
a whole. Then what we have heretofore thought of as “error-prone” is actually an attempt at
“error-correction,” where the “error” is of a different, deeper kind than we use to think about.
5.6 Evolution as learning
From Paley to Dawkins [29], there is universal agreement that adaptations are incredibly impres-
sive and complex pieces of “natural technology.” While Paley used this observation to make the
non-scientific point that, much like a watch has an intelligent watchmaker, life was created by a
supernatural intelligence [118], Dawkins argued that the process responsible for life is a very simple
process of random mutation and natural selection that is fully understood at its essence. In the
preface to The Blind Watchmaker [30], he wrote that “[t]his book is written in the conviction that
our own existence once presented the greatest of all mysteries, but that it is a mystery no longer...
Darwin and Wallace solved it, though we shall continue to add footnotes to their solution for a while
yet.” Let us revisit the question, but from a strictly scientific perspective, and without assuming
that all that is important in principle was revealed at Darwin’s time: Could the process generating
life forms and the process generating artificial technology be similar in some respects?
Interestingly, according to Papaj [121], it is a curious historical fact that the earliest ideas on
evolution, i.e., Lamarckism, revolved around observations on automatism in behavior: observations
showing that instinct is similar to well-learned behavior—an evolved phenomenon is similar to a
learned phenomenon—in that both can be carried out automatically and independently of external
influences, and both are stereotyped, or robotic, repeating with a high degree of uniformity. These
observations fostered the idea that what is repeated many times over the generations gradually
impresses itself upon the hereditary makeup of the organism, which then led to the additional but
erroneous idea of Lamarckian transmissionism. Until now, Lamarckism has been the only alterna-
tive to natural selection at the most basic level of analysis. And even though it has been rightfully
rejected as a general-level explanation for evolution, the observations it was supposed to explain
are still here (and have been discussed in section 4). That is, the controversy was never over the
observations but rather over the mechanism of evolution. The current paper provides a new inter-
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pretation of these original observations and suggests that there is a connection between evolution
and learning: network-level evolution and automatization are key to both. This connection is free of
Lamarckian transmissionism and requires a process based on non-accidental mutation and natural
selection.
Not only in evolution, but also in the study of brain and behavior, the notion of random
generation and filtering was once used. For instance, Skinner had suggested a mechanism of random
generation of ideas and filtering for how learning by the brain works [50]. However, more recently,
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini argued that such a mechanism applies neither to evolution nor to
the brain [50]26. In this paper and in [93], I argued that the mechanism of evolution is not that of
random generation and filtering, and that the causes of mutation are critical for our understanding
of evolution. This may also inform our understanding of learning.
In this context of connecting evolution and learning, Valiant’s [143, 144] recent work attempting
to connect evolution and machine learning (see also [45, 47, 46, 72, 3] in the same line, and [20])
signifies a methodological turning point: unlike classical population genetics, it provides rigorous
mathematical techniques that capture analytically a complex phenotypic structure and allow us
to quantify and study the evolution of complexity [143, 144]. Thus, with respect to theoretical
methodology, it is a grand vision and, in principle, it allows mutation to be non-accidental27.
However, while Valiant’s framework allows for, but has not yet substantially pursued, non-accidental
mutation, interaction-based evolution argues that mutation is non-accidental and that this is crucial
for evolution. And while Valiant’s work may be an inspiring step in the right direction, according to
the present paper, there are elements that are not yet included in it that are essential for biological
evolution based on non-accidental mutation. These include cooption; the idea that simplification
under performance pressure produces elements that have the inherent capacity to become useful
in new contexts, which leads to cooption; the idea that learning through evolutionary change is
a learning from the environment by emancipation and acceleration (see section 4.13), i.e., by the
evolution of automatization and innateness; and the concept of the absorption of meaning from
context under gradual network-level change. Indeed, the importance of cooption in evolution cannot
26Likewise, Lakatosh asked whether there is nothing more to intelligence than randomization as generating ideas
and selection sifting among them [86].
27It allows mutation to be an outcome of any implementable randomized algorithm—an algorithm that is allowed
to use random bits among else, which is different from mutations that are nothing but random changes anywhere in
the genome
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be overestimated, and has been demonstrated here at both the molecular and phenotypic levels
(sections 2 and 4). Furthermore, cooption is analogous to an analogy or metaphor, which are crucial
in the evolution of language as well as in human intelligence. It may be of much interest to explore
these missing elements from a computational perspective.
Since its inception [93], interaction-based evolution has been deeply connected to the computa-
tional worldview [120, 73], because it proposed that mutation is an event of information flow and
computation: the inputs into a mutational event are the alleles at the loci affecting the mutation
through genetic interaction, and the output is the mutation itself (by “mutation” I mean not only a
change in the DNA but any heritable change, such as an epigenetic change) [93]. Furthermore, the
fact that the output of a mutational event at one generation, namely the mutation itself, can serve
as an input into mutational events at later generations means that the mutation-writing phenotype
creates a network of information flow through the generations, from many genes into any one gene
and from any one gene to many (see Figure 2) [93]. Other examples of networks of information
flow and computation include the brain, and what computer scientists call a circuit [119, 161] (one
instance of which is an artificial neural network [66]). Thus, according to interaction-based evolu-
tion, genetic evolution can be seen as the result of the workings of a network, itself evolving over
time.
Interestingly, in artificial neural networks, local computational elements are used such as Heb-
bian learning (e.g., [66]). In the latter, when one neuron persistently participates in causing another
to fire, the strength of the synapse between them is increased [62]. Hebbian learning is an example
of a local simplification operation that, in the context of the gradual change of a complex network,
is useful. Now, elements of this sort can play a role in the network of information flow generated
by sex and non-accidental mutation proposed by interaction-based evolution [93]; indeed, the mu-
tational fusion mechanism in section 2.1 is one such case. Thus, we see in multiple ways that,
according to interaction-based evolution, evolution and “thinking processes” have more to do with
each other than previously thought, even though no Lamarckism and no “foresight” or “adaptive
mutation” as traditionally defined are involved. Thus, the study of evolution could inform the
study of learning and vice-versa.
Recently, a connection between evolution and learning was drawn by Watson and Szathma´ry
[160] and Watson et al. [159]. While this connection shares with the theory of interaction-based
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evolution as proposed in [93] and here the idea that evolution is network-based, and that the
change of connections between the nodes of the network is key, there are also some fundamental
differences between the two. Watson and Szathma´ry [160] and Watson et al. [159] did not argue
for non-accidental mutation, and all that follows from it.
For example, it follows from non-accidental mutation that Hebbian-learning–like mechanisms
can be implemented directly by the mutational mechanisms themselves (as opposed to needing to
arise from random mutation and natural selection), as discussed in section 2.1. There, I argued that
genes that are used together are fused together28. More generally, I argued that simplification can
be implemented by mutational mechanisms. In fact, the very concept of non-accidental mutation
itself represents a vast network, as discussed here and in [93]. Conceptualizing mutation not as a
local accident disconnected from its genetic environment, but rather as the outcome of network-
based processes, provides a far more involved network-based view of evolution than otherwise. It
also greatly strengthens the connection between computer science and evolution [120, 73].
In addition, borrowing from knowledge in machine learning, the above-mentioned authors men-
tion that, among other things, imposing parsimony pressure by imposing a connection cost in
models of genotype-phenotype maps can facilitate evolution in these models [160, 159, 22, 81].
However, they do not put simplification pressure front and center in biological evolution, as done
here. The present paper established the importance of simplification in biological evolution by
providing both the rationale and many empirical examples from both the molecular and pheno-
typic levels behind this point. On this foundation, it argued that biological evolution is driven by
two forces—the pressure for performance and the pressure for simplification. A cycle in evolution
begins at a fuzzy state from the emergent interactions between preexisting elements. From these
interactions, simplification under performance pressure creates new elements that have the inherent
capacity to come together into unexpected, useful interactions with other such elements. This leads
to cooption, and to the beginning of another cycle in the process. Thus, putting simplification front
and center in biological evolution also puts cooption at the heart of the evolutionary process. In
addition, from this cycle we also obtain the idea that simplification leads to biological complexity
28In contrast, Watson et al. argue that “genes that are selected together are wired together.” There is a fundamental
difference between the two statements, because Watson et al. imply a process of random mutation and natural
selection. Namely, they base their statement on a pioneering theoretical model [122], but one that is constructed
within the random-mutation view.
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(section 3).
While one would need to justify biologically a substantial cost to a single genetic connection
per se if traditional selection is to simplify a genetic network based on random mutation, according
to interaction-based evolution, simplification is inherent to biological evolution, and can be im-
plemented by mutational mechanisms. Indeed, interaction-based evolution argues that mutational
mechanisms, mixing of the hereditary material (which has evolved into sex), simplification and
selection have all existed from the “beginning” of life, and that they did not evolve from an asexual
world with random mutation, since that world never existed [93]. Thus, they are not elements that
evolved by random mutation and natural selection based on different costs and benefits imposed
by selection, but rather are primary elements that are original and inherent to the process of evo-
lution. Thus, interaction-based evolution is different from the evolvability view present in previous
biological literature.
Indeed, interaction-based evolution provides a complete, biologically motivated, conceptual
framework for evolution with non-accidental mutation at its center. By arguing that novelty arises
from emergent interactions, it places the source of novelty at the system level. This in turn replaces
the notion of accidental mutation as the ultimate source of heritable novelty, which in turn connects
back to the center-piece of non-accidental mutation. This entire framework and all of its elements,
including cooption, novelty and non-accidental mutation, as well as the idea that simplification
leads to complexity, and the idea that evolutionary learning occurs through automatization and
innateness, have not been discussed in previous papers on evolution and learning.
6 Conclusions
How does novelty arise? Traditional evolutionary thinking relies on random mutation and natural
selection. The idea is that radiation, or a copying error, or oxidative stress, “goes zap,” and a new
mutation appears that, on rare occasions, provides a beneficial phenotypic change. All that remains
for natural selection to do is to check whether this mutation on its own is good or bad—to play
the role of a filter. Where does the novelty, the new genetic information, come from? Presumably,
in that view, it comes from the accident itself—from out of thin air—and there is nothing more to
inquire regarding the source of it.
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Interaction-based evolution proposes an alternative to this view. The mutations that are rele-
vant for adaptive evolution under selection are due to mutational mechanisms that are continually
evolving, and that do not in and of themselves invent things. Rather, novelty arises from the system
level—from the macroscale—from gradual network-level evolution, as these mechanisms absorb in-
formation from selection. In brief, mutation mechanisms perform simplification operations on the
genetic network, as well as gene duplication, in a heritable mode. These mechanisms work together
with natural selection which acts on the organism as a complex whole, so that adaptive evolution is
a process of simplification under performance pressure. A cycle in this process begins with complex
high-level interactions between preexisting elements. Simplification under performance pressure
takes these preexisting interactions and, gradually, in the course of evolution, creates from them
new elements—new adaptations. Because these new elements are created in a process of simplifica-
tion under performance pressure, they have the inherent capacity of coming together in new, useful
and unexpected interactions at higher levels, thus initiating another cycle in the process. This
capacity to come together in useful high-level interactions that have not been pursued in advance
is the source of novelty in evolution. In short, mutations do not in and of themselves invent things,
but rather are a key activity that takes part in turning the wheel of evolution. Interestingly, it is
simplification that explains complexity: local simplification leads to a global increase in complexity.
Thus, while traditional theory is based on the idea that random mutation invents—where this
supposed random mutation is a remote, presumed event that cannot be seen or confirmed—the
theory presented here is based on the empirically evident fact that preexisting elements come
together into new, useful high-level interactions as the source of novelty in evolution. Note that it
matters not whether the novelty involved in the transitions from the genes TRIM5 and CypA to
their fusion, or from haphazard egg retrieval to backward walking, is small or great in and of itself.
Rather, these transitions exemplify the steps that tie together the process of evolution, which in
the long term lead from the progenote to humans.
We have a tendency to look for “foundations” from which everything else can be derived. In
particular, it is convenient to assume that the causes of mutation are random, because it puts an end
to all of our questions. The philosophical move that is required from the perspective of interaction-
based evolution is to let go of the notion that random mutation and novelty from a point are at the
bottom of things—that they provide a stable ground upward from which a conceptual edifice can
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be built; and to accept instead that the action is at the network level: that both the meaning and
origin of genetic and phenotypic elements comes from the higher levels of organization—it comes
from the network—from “above.” This move opens up the study of evolution substantially; because
while the notion of random mutation means that there is nothing of importance to be studied about
the causes of mutation from an evolutionary perspective, the concept of non-accidental mutation
provided by interaction-based evolution implies instead a whole world of biological mechanisms
open to investigation.
Before Darwin, people used to think that different species were each created separately in an
instant. While Darwin made an immense contribution by showing that this was not the case, and
that species are generated gradually, a notion of creation in an instant has been maintained in neo-
Darwinism in other areas: the origin of life, the origin of mutations, and cooption. While [93] argued
among else against the origin of life as an instant, this paper argues against the other two. Novelty
arises not suddenly from a point but from gradual network-level evolution. Indeed, if evolution
according to random mutation and natural selection is a sequence of independent points, each
representing a local accidental mutation disconnected from the rest, interaction-based evolution
draws the lines between these points (see [93]) while fundamentally altering their interpretation.
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Figure 1: Mutation as a biological process, from [93]. a) In this figure we see three loci coming
together in a biological interaction through gene products and cis elements. This part of the
figure merely represents schematically the gene regulation and interaction that are key to our
understanding of molecular and cellular biology. What is new about the figure is that we have not
yet fully considered the possibility that there could be a mutation arrow too, i.e., that mutation is an
outcome of genetic interactions in a heritable mode; i.e., that much like genes interact in influencing
a classical trait, like the eye or the ear, they also interact in influencing genetic change. Note that
the figure purposely leaves open the particulars of the biochemical mechanisms involved, as there
may be many such mechanisms, and that “mutation” is broadly construed to mean any heritable
genetic change. These may involve not only DNA changes but also epigenetic changes. b) Mutation
as an event of information flow and computation changes many things in our conceptualization
of evolution. Particularly, the biological process of mutation creates from the combination of
interacting alleles across loci a new heritable piece of information—a new mutation—a new allele,
B*. Even though the particular combination of interacting alleles will sooner or later disappear due
to the sexual shuffling of the genes, information from it can be transmitted to future generations
through the mutation. In this manner, the problems of the role of sexual recombination and of the
nature of mutation may be tied together.
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Figure 2: Mutation as an event of information transmission and computation creates a network of
information flow through the generations, from [93]. Each box represents an individual, and in each
box, the two sets of lines at the top represent that individual’s diploid genotype (genes A through
G), and the set of lines at the bottom represents a haploid genotype transmitted through the gamete.
For the sake of demonstration, a small number of mutational events due to interactions between
genes is shown in two parents and an offspring (large boxes), although many mutations occur in
other genes and in other individuals at the same time. For example, C* represents a mutation in
one of the alleles of gene C. Because the output of a mutational event in one generation—namely
the mutation itself (e.g., C*)—can serve as an input into mutational events at later generations
(e.g., the event creating D*), non-accidental mutation creates a network of information flow and
computation over the generations, from many genes into one and from one gene into many, as well
as from many individuals into one and from one individual to many.
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Figure 3: A flowchart describing the algorithmic behavior of nest building, egg laying and provi-
sioning in the digger wasp, Ammophila adriaansei. The main procedure begins with “start;” next
to it appear the subroutines “New nest,” “Get caterpillar” and “Do next provisioning phase...;”
and subroutine calls are denoted by rectangles with double vertical edges. Importantly, the entire
apparatus is innate and must have evolved somehow (learning is very limited, and is involved in
the acquisition of local orientation but not in the behaviors in the flowchart [102]). Interspersed
with the activities in the flowchart, the wasp may forage for herself or sleep (not shown). Note
that the flowchart is only an approximation, albeit a close one, because of minor incomplete de-
tails in Baerends’s [6] description (such as whether the wasp builds two nests or one after finishing
provisioning all existing nests, and several other details).
